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Abstract Meaning negotiation (MN) is the general process with which agents reach
an agreement about the meaning of a set of terms. Artificial Intelligence scholars have
dealt with the problem of MN by means of argumentations schemes, beliefs merging
and information fusion operators, and ontology alignment but the proposed approaches
depend upon the number of participants. In this paper, we give a general model of MN
for an arbitrary number of agents, in which each participant discusses with the others
her viewpoint by exhibiting it in an actual set of constraints on the meaning of the
negotiated terms. We call this presentation of individual viewpoints an angle. The
agents do not aim at forming a common viewpoint but, instead, at agreeing about an
acceptable common angle. We analyze separately the process of MN by two agents
(bilateral or pairwise MN) and by more than two agents (multiparty MN), and we
use game theoretic models to understand how the process develops in both cases: the
models are Bargaining Game for bilateral MN and English Auction for multiparty MN.
We formalize the process of reaching such an agreement by giving a deduction system
that comprises of rules that are consistent and adequate for representing MN.
Keywords Meaning negotiation · Agreement · Disagreement · Deduction · Viewpoints
1 Introduction and Motivations
In recent years, it has become clear that computer systems do not work in isolation.
Rather, computer systems are increasingly acting as elements in a complex, distributed
community of people and systems, which, in order to fulfill their tasks, must cooperate,
coordinate their activities and communicate with each other. In fact, cooperation and
coordination are needed almost everywhere computers are used. Relevant examples
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2include health institutions, electricity networks, electronic commerce, robotic systems,
digital libraries, military units etc.
Problems of coordination and cooperation are not a novelty due to the birth of
automated systems. They exist at multiple levels of activity in a wide range of human
agents as well. People achieve their own goals through communication and cooperation
with other people; and, in industrial systems, with machines as well.
The main difficulty in agent cooperation and communication is to understand each
other. People and, in general, intelligent agents come from different organizations and
individuals and thus they have different backgrounds and, maybe, different expression
languages. However, natural agents get to agreements as a means for solving conflicts.
Consequently, artificial agents, in order to be reasonably similar to human agents, to
an extent that grants their usefulness, are to be designed as agents that discuss to
reach an agreement by starting from distinct viewpoints.
Intelligent agents have been considered in a wide number of reasons and appli-
cations, that is in all the situations in which people can delegate their interests to
somebody else. In fact the word intelligent refers to the ability to behave, to reason
and to perceive situations and the environment the agents are in like humans do. In
all the applications of intelligent agents, a basic mechanism of agreement is required:
information agents, electronic commerce agents, agents in e-learning systems and legal
reasoning have to know the meaning of all the information they receive from others.
In all the situations in which a misunderstanding arises, the system does not work as
the user’s expectations and it produces wrong outcomes.
To achieve an agreement there are fundamentally four possibilities:
– delegate decision: consisting in the choice of an external agent that decides for all
the other agents involved;
– judge decision: consisting in the choice of an external agent that chooses among
the proposals of the agents;
– merging : consisting in generating a new theory starting from the merged ones;
– negotiation: consisting in a sequence of actions aiming at the definition of a novel,
shared position, emerged from the discussion itself, by means of a group of mech-
anisms, established as rules of the negotiation.
In general, negotiation is a dialogue between two or more agents by which they
try to reach an agreement about something starting from different viewpoints about
the shared object. A negotiation process is quantitative when the agents discuss about
how to share a set of countable objects, whereas in Meaning Negotiation, on which we
focus in this paper, the proposals are pieces of knowledge represented by terms, i.e.
the expressions of what an agent knows about the negotiated terms. These pieces of
knowledge may be accepted or rejected by the other discussants.
More specifically, Meaning Negotiation (henceforth MN) is a negotiation process
in which the sharing object is the meaning of a set of terms. A common LucaWhy “ac-
ceptable”? A definition is a definition. Maybe replace with “common”, “standard”,...
definition of MN is: the process that takes place when the involved agents have some
knowledge (some data or information) to share but do not agree on what knowledge
agents share and (possibly) how they reach an agreement about it.
In this paper, we focus on the processes that take place when the agents who
negotiate agree about the mechanisms to reach an agreement and disagree about the
meaning of the negotiated terms. In this case, agents know how to reach an agreement,
and see the mechanisms themselves as a protocol. We aim at designing a model of
3an inference engine whose derivations are indeed agreement processes. This approach
views meaning negotiation as an inference process.
To clarify what a negotiation process indeed is, let us introduce an example that
we will also employ in the rest of the paper as a running example.
Example 1 Consider two agents Alice and Bob that the negotiate the meaning of the
term “vehicle”. Suppose that Alice thinks that a vehicle always has two, three, four or
six wheels; a handlebar or a steering wheel; a motor, or two or four bicycle pedals, or
a tow bar. On the other hand, Bob thinks that it always has two, three or four wheels;
a handlebar or a steering wheel; a motor, or two or four bicycle pedals. Alice and Bob
are in disagreement because Bob does not know if a vehicle has a tow bar or not. 
In this example, the MN depends upon the relevance of the terms the agents use.
Alice and Bob define “vehicle” in different ways and with different terms. In fact, Alice
uses “tow bar” and Bob does not. Bob does not say anything about the tow bar maybe
he does not know what a tow bar is, or maybe he does not consider as relevant the
properties about the tow bar. In this paper, we assume that the agents make assertions
only about the properties they consider as relevant.
One of the main parameters of the MN is the number of the involved agents. In
Section 1.1, we discuss in detail how a negotiation process takes place between two
parties, whilst in Section 1.2 we discuss the situation arising when the number of
involved partners is higher than two.
Before we do so, we further exemplify the specific problems of the definition of an
inference engine, by considering a case taken from a common situation. We consider the
Description Logic framework, where the notion of term, and definitions, in particular,
of term, is part of the structure itself of the Logic. More specifically, in description
logic, the acceptability of a concept is tested by the subsumption relation. Having
two concepts A and B, A subsumes B (A v B) when the definition for B is also a
definition for A but not vice versa. Two concepts are equivalently defined when A v B
and B v A. Suppose that Alice considers A and B, where A v B, as two plausible
definitions for a concept X. Alice can accept a new definition C for X iff A v C v B
because Alice has a pair of concepts (A,B) describing the same things that C describes.
In the same way of the above mentioned Description Logic Framework, a logical
formula ϕ is acceptable with respect to an agent when she shares the interpretation of
all its terms. Therefore Alice always accepts ϕ when it is equivalent to her current angle
α, that is α↔ ϕ because I(α) = I(ϕ) where I is an interpretation function, but Alice
will accept ϕ also when she has a pair of feasible angles α and β such that α→ ϕ→ β
because I(α) ⊆ I(ϕ) ⊆ I(β). In the last case Alice shares the interpretation of all
the terms in ϕ by means of two angles α and β that are partial representations of her
knowledge she considers as acceptable.
An agent always accepts a logical theory when it is equivalent to her own one, i.e.
when the two theories have the same set of semantical models. The logical equivalence
is always a condition of agreement but there are situations in which it is not a necessary
condition and some weaker conditions are sufficient to claim the agreement. In fact,
a logical theory may be considered acceptable when it is a good compromise for an
agent, i.e the logical theory expresses an acceptable part of what the agent wants to
express. In this sense, the set of semantical models of the proposal is not equal to the
set of semantical models of the theory of the agent, but the agent has a superset and
a subset of models bounding it.
4Conclusively, the participants to a discussion may disagree, in fact, in three different
ways:
– The properties used to define the terms are inconsistent and contradictory.
– The relevant properties for an agent are more/less than those expressed by one or
more other agents.
– Some agents do not know the properties used by someone in the multiple agent
system.
The idea of our framework is that the knowledge of an agent represents her view-
point about the world and in order to negotiate with the other agents, an agent possibly
has a set of acceptable portions of her knowledge that she may consider as good com-
promises with respect to her viewpoint.
We call angle any partial representation of a viewpoint. The knowledge of a negoti-
ation is built by a single viewpoint and many angles, i.e. many partial representations
of it. Moreover, in this paper we assume that angles are presented as logical theories,
and in particular propositional ones. At the beginning of a MN process, agents are
in disagreement, i.e. they have mutually inconsistent knowledge. By MN, they try to
reach a common angle representing a shared acceptable knowledge, where the MN ends
in positive way when the agents have a common knowledge, and it ends in negative
way otherwise: agents are in agreement when they have found a set of constraints on
the meaning of the negotiated terms that is accepted by both agents (this new theory
is named, here, a common angle); disagreement when they are not in agreement. To
negotiate the meaning of a set of terms means to propose definitions, properties, typical
memberships of the terms’ definitions, and/or to accept or to reject definitions.
1.1 Bilateral Meaning Negotiation
When the negotiation involves two agents, each proposal has one sender and one
receiver. Game Theory scholars have dealt with several bilateral negotiation proto-
cols like Divorce (Wurman et al, 2001), Pleadings (Gordon, 1993) and the Bargaining
Game (Kambe, 1995). When the negotiation is bilateral the agents are called buyer
and seller (which is typically the first proposing agent). Both the buyer and the seller
have the same feasible actions: they make a proposal or accept or reject an offer.
As a matter of fact, it is the Bargaining game that offers the most natural framework
for meaning negotiation, due to the need for negotiators to avoid the meaning of terms
to be negotiated to be a compromise between the definitions preferred by the two
agents, that implies that the negotiators play by moving themselves to the other’s
viewpoint with the maximally possible flexibility.
In the Bargaining Game, two agents have to share, say, one dollar and do this by
each making a proposal. If the sum of their demands is less than one, they share the
dollar, otherwise they have to make a new demand. The Bargaining Game is built by
two stages:
– Demand stage: agents make a proposal and if the proposals are compatible, the
negotiation ends in positive way; otherwise the second stage begins.
– War of attrition: agents have incompatible viewpoints and perform new demands.
If the demands are compatible, the process ends positively, otherwise they make
new ones.
5In the Bargaining Game, players have a negotiation power that represents how often an
agent cedes during the negotiation and how much she resists about her current angle.
The negotiation power of an agent is captured by a set of partially ordered angles of
her viewpoint. The partial order among the angles allows an agent to choose the next
proposal to perform, and to evaluate the acceptability of the received offers. Moreover,
the set of partially ordered angles has a minimum that identifies the last offer an agent
proposes in a negotiation. We say that each agent has
– one single stubborn and
– many flexible angles
that are respectively the limit proposal (i.e., the last offer) and the acceptable ones,
where each flexible angle is consistent with the stubborn knowledge.
The Meaning Negotiation process ends in a positive way (agreement) when both
agents agree about a common definition of the meaning of the set of terms, i.e. they
propose the same thing, or in a negative way (disagreement) when they are not in
agreement and they have no more proposal to perform.
1.2 Multiple parties’ Meaning Negotiation
When the number of agents is more than two, the negotiation is multiparty and each
proposal has one sender and many receivers. A proposal may be accepted or rejected by
all the agents or by only some of them, and the receivers may answer in different ways.
The negotiation process for multiparty scenarios is computationally harder than the
bilateral one and it needs the organization of the order in which agents make assertions
(proposals, acceptance or rejection of offers) during the process. The modeling of the
Meaning Negotiation in this case depends also on the role of the involved agents. Having
n+ 1 agents in the negotiation, the possible role distinctions are:
– 1-n: one seller and many buyers;
– n-1: many sellers and one buyer;
– n1-n2: many sellers and many buyers.
In the first case, the agents behave like in an auction. Before entering the auction, the
seller establishes a maximal price for the item. The seller begins the game by making
the initial request that is the reservation price. The auction develops by beats. A beat
consists of:
1. the seller makes a request;
2. each buyer proposes a counteroffer or accepts the seller’s proposal.
No more beat begins if the maximal price is reached or if the buying agents do not
make new proposals. In an auction scenario, a proposal is also called a bid. The end of
the auction is established by the seller, i.e. by the auctioneer. In general, in an auction
there is only one winner, i.e. only one agent buys the item in the auction.
The second case, n-1, is similar to the first one. The sellers have to convince the
buyer to accept the price they propose and when the buyer is not convinced she has
to respond with another offer. In the Meaning Negotiation perspective, a buyer is not
different from a seller because they have the same feasible action: accept an offer,
reject an offer or make a proposal. Even if the agents generally have different strategies
depending on their role, i.e. typically a buyer enhances instead the seller fall the last
6offer, the purpose of the seller and of the buyer is the same: to meet the opponent’s
request. Therefore, buyers and sellers make new proposals in the same way, that is by
ceding their last one.
The third case, n1-n2, is called fish market. For a reference on the different ways to
perform negotiation, see Lomuscio et al (2003). It is not possible to make a modeling of
the MN of this multiple-agent system structure because there is no agent monitoring
the process and no behavioral guidelines for the players. In the first two cases, the
auctioneers, the seller in the first and the buyer in the second, are the agents who control
the Meaning Negotiation process and check whether an agreement is reached between
the involved agents. As in the auction game, in the fish market each agent makes a
proposal or accepts/rejects the opponents’ one but there is no coordination among the
agents. It may be the case that two or more agents make proposals simultaneously so
each agent is a buyer, i.e. she makes an offer, and a seller, i.e. she evaluates the received
offers, at the same time. The result is that a common proposal is difficult to find. In
the worst case, where there are n agents involved in negotiation in total, this means
there can be up to n(n − 1)/2 negotiation threads. Clearly, from an analysis point of
view, this makes such negotiation hard to handle.
In this paper, as in the main approach in the current Artificial Intelligence liter-
ature, we model the multiparty MN by reserving an agent, typically the first bidding
one, to be the referee of the process and the game used to represent it is the auction. In
Game Theory, there are several auction types (Benameur et al, 2002): English, Dutch,
Vickrey, First-price sealed-bid etc. The types of auction differ on the behavior of the
agents involved and on the number of the proposals the agents make. In this paper we
use the English Auction because the agents behave as in the Bargaining Game. The
English Auction Game begins by the proposal of the auctioneer that is called reserva-
tion price and it is the minimum price the agents have to pay to win the auction. In
the next step of the English Auction, each player makes her offer by incrementing the
last bidden one, i.e. the auctioneer’s proposal. There is not a fixed number of turns
for agents’ bidding, instead the game continues until no more bids are performed. The
game ends with a winner that is the agent who bids the highest offer.
In a MN perspective, the English Auction game is slightly different in the outcome.
The goal of the negotiation is agents in sharing a viewpoint. Therefore the positive
ending condition of the game is that all the agents make the same bid and the bidden
proposal is the representation of their viewpoints.
There are MN contexts in which it is sufficient to have a “major” part of agreeing
agents to consider positive the negotiation. In general “major part” means that a
number of agents, typically more then 50% , but it may mean that a part of the
most trustworthy agents are in agreement. In the former case, the minimum number
of agreeing agents is a parameter of the game: suppose α is the chosen number for
“major part”, the MN continues until at least α agents agree about a common angle.
The minimum number of agreeing agents is called degree of sharing. A MN process for
more than two agents, say n agents, has two positive ending conditions and two types
of positive outcomes, if a positive outcome exists:
partially positive : when the degree of sharing is less than the number of the partici-
pants (α < n);
totally positive : when the degree of sharing is equal to the number of the negotiating
agents (α = n).
7The latter case prevails when there are specialists about the negotiation subject into
the multiple agent system and their opinion is more relevant then the opponents’ ones.
When participating to a negotiation process, the agents assume a viewpoint and many
admissible angles of it. A specialist knows more about the negotiation subject than
a less expert agent and her negotiation behavior will be to make concessions as few
as possible. Conversely, if a no expert agent knows that an agent in the MAS is a
specialist, then she trusts the specialist and probably makes concessions with respect
to the proposals of the specialist. The degree of knowledge of an agent translates into
the trustworthiness with respect to herself. In this paper, the trustworthiness of the
agent is not specifically considered because it is out of the scope of the paper and it is
left as a future work.
The role of the auctioneer is to monitor the game in order to understand when
it ends and whether in a positive or a negative way. In general, the auctioneer is the
first bidding agent but in a negotiation perspective she may play in two ways: active
or passive. An active referee is a participant of the negotiation and the reservation
price is her viewpoint. Moreover, an active referee makes herself proposals during the
auction as all the other agents and she is considered in the agreement test. A passive
auctioneer does not affect the negotiation. She only tests the process and makes only
one bid, the first one for the reservation price.
1.3 Aims of proposed approach
The aim of the paper is to give a general model to represent the process of MN by
means of a deduction system. Our formalization is based upon Game Theory notions
of behavior of the agents during a negotiation/litigation. The negotiation process has
already been dealt in terms of games but, to the best of our knowledge, only quanti-
tative negotiation were studied. MN is not quantitative thus one of the main problem
in dealing with it is the identification of the agreement and disagreement situations,
i.e. the mutual evaluation of the proposals of the players. The purpose of the paper is
to extend the current literature with the formalization of the MN problem by means
of a deduction system that is independent of the number of the involved agents and of
their expression languages. Our work begins with the study of the representation of the
knowledge of the agents in a MN, and in particular the representation of the properties
the agents consider as necessary and unforgivable in defining the meaning of the set
of terms they are negotiating and, vice versa, which are the facultative ones, because
these properties identify the negotiation space between agents. We call the first one
the stubborn knowledge of the agent and flexible knowledge the second one.
The first contribution of the paper is the definition of the meaning negotiating
agent in terms of her stubborn and flexible knowledge.
The second contribution of the paper is the study of the agreement and disagree-
ment situations between the agents and the definition of the different ways in which
they may be in disagreement (absolute, relative, essence and compatibility).
As said above, one important issue in MN is the evaluation of a received proposal.
Agents make proposal and evaluate the opponents’ one. The evaluation mechanism is
not trivial when the negotiation is not quantitative. When is one definition of a set of
terms better than another one? When are two or more definitions equivalent? Here, we
study how a proposal is evaluated with respect to the knowledge of an agent. In our
8model, the types of disagreement depend upon the relation among the proposal p and
the stubborn and the flexible knowledge of the agent i who receives and evaluates p:
– Call-away occurs when p is a generalization1 of the stubborn knowledge of i, thus
it would correspond to dropping out some unquestionable knowledge.
– Absolute disagreement occurs when the stubborn knowledge of i is inconsistent with
respect to p.
– Essence disagreement occurs when the flexible knowledge of i is inconsistent with
respect to p.
– Compatibility occurs when p is consistent with the flexible knowledge of i but it is
not a generalization or a restriction of i’s viewpoint.
– Relative disagreement occurs when p is a generalization of the flexible knowledge
of i.
The call-away situations arise when an agent does not accept all the necessary requests
of the other one and thus exits the MN so that the MN ends negatively.
An important point in MN as well as of the Multiple Agent Systems (MAS), is
the strategical component in the definition of negotiating agent. In this paper we do
not give any definition of strategy of agents but we assume that whenever an agent
has to choose the next move, she has a way to do it. In general, in MAS literature
there are two main ways in which the agents behave: collaborative and competitive. A
collaborative agent always chooses the move that improves the welfare of the MAS she
is in, whereas a competitive agent moves in order to achieve her goals and, possibly, to
prevent the other ones. The study of the strategies in MN process needs the definition
of MAS welfare and goals, and of the attainment of a goal.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: in Section 2 we formalize the negoti-
ating agents in terms of their knowledge and language, Section 3 defines the agreement
and disagreement relations between agents and gives the deduction rules for bilateral
and multiparty MN and Section 4 discusses the current approaches of Artificial Intel-
ligence community for MN. The paper ends with the summary of the contributions of
our work and with a discussion of future work (Section 5).
2 A Formalization of Negotiating Agents
We consider here a general MN process, so we abstract away from the particular terms
whose meaning the agents are negotiating. We first consider the knowledge of negoti-
ating agents (Section 2.1), i.e. what agents know about the meaning of the set of terms
they are negotiating, and then their language (Section 2.2), i.e. how they represent
their knowledge and how they make proposals during the MN.
2.1 The Knowledge of Negotiating Agents
When agents give the definition of a concept, they:
– give the necessary (stubborn) properties and the characterizing (flexible) ones;
1 A theory A is a generalization of a theory B when the models of A are a superset of the
models of B.
9– give the properties that necessarily have not to hold and the ones that plausibly
(flexibly) have not to hold; and
– give the formulas asserting what has not (stubbornly), or may not (flexibly), be
used in the definition.
The notion of relevance of a formula is interesting at this stage of the definition, but
instead of introducing a novel operator, we simply consider a formula as not relevant
to an agent if she does not assert it. When i asserts a formula ϕ, she has a way to
evaluate it: she thinks ϕ as positive or negative. If i does not assert ϕ then either i
does not know ϕ, i.e., she is not able to evaluate it or i does not think ϕ is relevant
in defining the negotiated meaning. So, we assume that whenever i thinks ϕ as not
relevant for the negotiation, i never asserts ϕ during the negotiation.
Example 2 As in Example 1, consider the definition of the term “vehicle”. Alice (stub-
bornly) thinks that it always has two, three, four or six wheels; a handlebar or a steering
wheel; a motor, or two or four bicycle pedals, or a tow bar. Moreover, Alice (flexibly)
thinks that a “vehicle” may be defined only as a car, then having four wheels, a steer-
ing wheel, and a motor; or only as a bicycle, then having two wheels, a handlebar and
two bicycle pedals. In other words, Alice has two acceptable ways to define a vehi-
cle (namely, a car or a bicycle as particular “vehicles”) but she has only one general
description of a “vehicle”. 
The necessary and the characterizing properties of a concept definition are closely
related to EGG/YOLK objects, introduced by Lehmann and Cohn (1994) as a way to
represent class membership based on typicality of the members: the egg is the set of
the class members and the yolk is the set of the typical ones. For instance, the class of
“employees” of a company A may be defined as “the set of people that receive money
from the company in exchange for carrying out the instructions of a person who is an
employee of that company”, thus excluding, e.g., the head of the company (who has
no boss), and the typical employee would include regular workers like secretaries and
foremen. Another company B might have a different definition, e.g., including the head
of the company, resulting in a mismatch. Nevertheless, if both companies provide some
typical examples of “employees” it is possible that all of A’s typical employees fit B’s
definition, and all of B’s typical employees fit A’s definition: YOLKB ≤ EGGA and
YOLKA ≤ EGGB , in the terminology of (Lehmann and Cohn, 1994).
In this paper, we use the same idea to express that negotiating agents have a pref-
erence over their knowledge: the properties an agent thinks as necessary are the typical
ones, and the characterizing properties are those that are not typical but plausible. We
focus on the models of the knowledge of an agent. The stubborn properties of a con-
cept definition are the most acceptable ones, therefore they thus have more elements
satisfying them than the flexible properties have. Hence, we represent the elements
satisfying the stubborn properties in the egg and those satisfying the flexible ones in
the yolk. Differently from the original model, concept definitions are here restricted by
stubborn properties to the largest acceptable set of models, hence represented by the
egg, whilst the yolk is employed to denote the most restricted knowledge, that is, the
one on which the agents are flexible.
The stubborn properties never change during the negotiation; therefore, the egg
is fixed at the beginning of the MN. Instead, the flexible part of the definition of a
concept is the core of the proposal of a negotiating agent. Each proposal differs from
the further ones in two possible ways: it may give a definition of the negotiated object
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that is more descriptive than the next ones, or the given definition specifies properties
that the next ones do not and vice versa. In the former case, we say that the agent
carries out a weakening action, in the latter the agent carries out a changing theory
action. In this paper, we do not consider how and why an agent chooses the next
action to perform, but a general approach for dealing with agency in multiple agent
system (MAS) is based on the representation of the choice of the action to perform by
attitudes, which “are driving forces behind the actions of agents” (Meyer et al, 1999).
In other words, attitudes are the representation of the reasons that guide the agents in
their behavior. They are preferences between the criteria used to evaluate the feasible
actions. In general, the main criteria for evaluating an action are:
1. The MAS welfare: is the action positive for all the agents in the MAS?
2. The personal advantage: is the action individually positive for the agent in choosing
an action?
By attitude, we mean the preference order of the evaluation criteria. Following the
enumeration in the list above, the main attitudes in agency are:
– collaborative: the main goal of the agent is the welfare of the MAS: 1 is preferred
to 2;
– competitive: the action performed by a competitive agent are advantageous or not
damaging herself: 2 is preferred to 1.
In a MN perspective, a collaborative agent aims at ending the process as soon as
possible, whilst a competitive agent tends to stay as close as possible to her initial
viewpoint. The collaborative and the competitive attitudes are dual.
However, none of the weakening or changing theory actions can be carried out with
respect to a proposal if the proposal describes the necessary properties of the object in
the MN. We say that in such a situation the agents always make a stubbornness action
that is equivalent to no more change.
2.2 The Language of Negotiating Agents
Each agent i is represented by her language  Li, which is composed of two disjoint
sublanguages (where we intend, with “language”, the set of well-formed formulae of a
logical language):
– a stubbornness language containing the properties i deems as necessary in defining
the negotiated meaning and
– a flexible language containing the properties i deems as not necessary in the MN.
Definition 1 (Σi and  Li) Consider an abstract set of terms and let Ag be the set of
the negotiating agents. The signature Σi of an agent i ∈ Ag is the pair 〈Pi, αi〉 where
– Pi is the set of the predicate symbols;
– αi : Pi → N is the arity function for predicate symbols.
The language  Li of i ∈ Ag comprises of Σi-formulas defined inductively as follows:
– If P ∈ Pi, αi(P ) = n and t1, . . . , tn are terms then P (t1, . . . , tn) is a Σi-formula.
– If ϕ and ψ are Σi-formulas then ¬ϕ, ϕ ∧ ψ, ϕ ∨ ψ, and ϕ→ ψ are Σi-formulas.
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flexki → flexk+1i ¬(stubi ↔ flexki )
flexk+1i
(W )
flexki ¬(stubi ↔ flexki ) ¬(flexki → flexk+1i ) ¬(flexk+1i → flexki )
flexk+1i
(C)
ϕ stubi ↔ ϕ
ϕ (S)
Table 1 Rules for making new proposals and the corresponding EGG/YOLKs. The dark gray
yolk identifies flexk+1i and the light gray one identifies flex
k
i .
Definition 2 (Stubbornness and Flexibility of an agent) The agent i considers
the formulas in  Li in two ways: stubborn or flexible. That is, the language  Li is divided
in two disjoint sets:  Li =  LSi ∪  LFi , where
 LSi is the set of stubborn formulas;
 LFi is the set of flexible formulas.
We further define
stubi =
∧
ϕ∈ LSi
ϕ
and
flex i =
∧
ϕ∈ LFi
ϕ
During a negotiation process, the viewpoint of each agent is presented in a specific
angle. In other words, a viewpoint is a hierarchy of theories, related by the partial order
relation of weakening, and an element of this hierarchy is an angle. Each agent presents
angles in sequence during the negotiation. Thus we call current angle formula (CAF )
the angle presented at the current stage of the negotiation. A flexible formula flexki
expresses the kth angle discussed in the MN by the agent i and it changes during the
process. We assume here that for each CAF flexki there is a stubborn formula in  LSi
that is a generalization of it. In general, during a negotiation of the meaning of a term,
the agents relax their viewpoint in order to meet the opponent’s one, and they do this
only if the relaxing formula is not too general. Then, for each assertion in the MN, the
agents have a maximal generalization of it and this is a formula in the stubbornness
set. For instance, if the object of the negotiation is the meaning of pen, an agent is
flexible on the ink color of the object but not on the fact that the object contains ink;
then, the red ink predicate is a flexible one and the contains ink predicate is a stubborn
one.
flexki changes during the MN by applying to it one of the rules for making new
proposals given in Table 1: weakening (W ), changing theory (C) or stubbornness (S).
The EGG/YOLK representations show the collocation of the new proposal (in the
stubbornness situation the new proposal is the same as the last one).
Let flexki be the last proposal of an agent i during a MN. There are two ways for
i to make a new proposal flexk+1i . The weakening rule (W ) states that i can propose
flexk+1i if flex
k+1
i is entailed by flex
k
i (i.e., flex
k
i → flexk+1i ) and flexki is not the most
general formula the agent can negotiate (corresponding to her stubbornness viewpoint,
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i.e., flexki ↔ stubi). Note that if i weakens, say, flex0i to the new CAF flex1i , then i
may be no more able to satisfy flex0i .
The rule (C) states that i can just change angle. Suppose that flexki is the last
proposal of an agent i during a MN. There are two ways for i to make a new proposal
flexk+1i . In the first case, expressed by the weakening rule (W ), i proposes flex
k+1
i if
flexk+1i is entailed by flex
k
i (i.e., flex
k
i → flexk+1i ) and flexki is not the most general
formula the agent can negotiate (corresponding to her stubbornness viewpoint, i.e.,
flexki ↔ stubi). In the second case, expressed by the rule (C), i just changes theory.
Although we do not consider MN strategies in detail here, in general, an agent chooses
whether to perform a weakening or a changing theory action by applying the corre-
sponding rule, but there are situations in which one action is better than the other. For
instance, when an agent checks the compatibility situation it seems better to weaken
the theory rather than changing it so to try to entail the opponent’s viewpoint, while
in essence disagreement situations it seems better to change the theory rather than
weakening it so to try to meet the opponent’s viewpoint.
If agent i is in stubbornness does she continue the negotiation or does she have to
exit it? We assume that the agent exits the MN only if all the agents in the negotiation
are stubborn. But an agent does not know the opponent’s stubbornness viewpoint, so
the exit condition is recognized only by the system. However, the stubborn agent always
makes the same proposal during the MN, as expressed by the rule (S). If flexki ↔ stubi
then flexk1i = flex
k1+1
i for all k1 > k.
Let us now go deeply inside the negotiation process constraints. If an agent i makes
a weakening of flex0i and has flex
1
i as the CAF, then i is no more able to satisfy flex
0
i .
As we show below, the process of negotiation, means relaxing of individual hierarchies.
In particular, based upon the reasoning above, flexki is the k
th angle of agent i.
We introduce a set of Σi-structures as agents change angles during the negotiation
process and these viewpoints have to be satisfied in different structures. We thus define
the semantical structure of a signature, which is built by a domain set and an inter-
pretation function mapping predicate symbols into tuples of elements of the domain.
We use a parameter k to denote the kth structure of the kth angle.
Definition 3 Given a signature Σi = 〈Pi, αi〉, a Σi-structure Ai is a pair 〈Di, Ii〉
where the domain Di is a finite non-empty set and the interpretation function Ii is
such that Ii(P ) ⊆ Dni for all P ∈ Pi for which α(P ) = n.
We define the set ofΣi-structuresAki as Si = {Aki | Aki = 〈Dki , Iki 〉} whereDki ⊆ Di
is the domain set with respect to agent i and, for all pairs (Iki , Ik+1i ), if the (k + 1)th
rule that agent i applied is:
– (W ), then Iki (P ) ⊆ Ik+1i (P ) for all P ∈ Pi;
– (C), then Iki (P ) 6= Ik+1i (P ), Iki (P ) * Ik+1i (P ) and Ik+1i (P ) * Iki (P ) for all
P ∈ Pi;
– (S), then Iki (P ) = Ik+1i (P ), for all P ∈ Pi.
If ϕ and ψ are Σi-formulas then:
– Aki |= P (t1, . . . , tn) iff (Ii(t1), . . . , Ii(tn)) ∈ Ii(P ), where P ∈ Pi and t1, . . . , tn are
terms;
– Aki |= ¬ϕ iff Aki 6|= ϕ;
– Aki |= ϕ ∧ ψ iff Aki |= ϕ and Aki |= ψ;
– Aki |= ϕ ∨ ψ iff Aki |= ϕ or Aki |= ψ;
– Aki |= ϕ→ ψ iff Aki |= ψ or Aki |= ¬ϕ.
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Example 3 Suppose Alice defines “vehicle” as in Example 1. Then
stubA = (has2wheels ∨ has3wheels ∨ has4wheels ∨ has6wheels) ∧
(hasHandlebar ∨ hasSteeringWheel) ∧
(hasMotor ∨ has2bicyclePedals ∨ has4bicyclePedals ∨ hasTowBar)
is the stubbornness part of Alice’s knowledge whose interpretation is I(stubA) =
{bicycle, tandem,motorbike, scooter, truck, car, trailer, chariot}. Let
flexkA = has4wheels ∧ hasSteeringWheel ∧ (hasMotor ∨ has2bicyclePedals)
be the CAF of Alice that it is not equivalent to her stubbornness knowledge and its
interpretation is I(flexkA) = {car, truck} ⊂ I(stubA). Suppose Alice changes her CAF
by means of a weakening action (W ); then:
flexk+1A = (has4wheels ∨ has2wheels) ∧ (hasSteeringWheel ∨ hasHandlebar) ∧
(hasMotor ∨ has2bicyclePedals)
The interpretation of flexk+1A is I(flexk+1A ) = {motorbike, scooter, car, truck} ⊂ I(flexkA).
Otherwise, suppose Alice changes her CAF by means of a changing theory action (C);
then:
flexk+1A = has6wheels ∧ hasSteeringWheel ∧ (hasMotor ∨ hasTowBar)
The interpretation of flexk+1A is I(flexk+1A ) = {truck, trailer} and I(flexk+1A ) *
I(flexkA). 
3 The MN Process
In this section, we formalize the MN process by defining the negotiation language
(Section 3.1), i.e. how the agents send their proposals to the opponents, and the ne-
gotiation rules (Section 3.2) governing the development of the MN process, both for
bilateral (Section 3.2.1) and 1-n negotiation (Section 3.2.2). We then (Section 3.3)
show how the bilateral MN develops depending upon the relation between the stub-
born knowledge of the agents. We do not show the development of the 1-n MN because
it can be viewed as n − 1 instances of bilateral MN between the auctioneer and the
other agents, where n is the number of the involved agents.
During the MN, agents make proposals and say if they are in agreement or not with
respect to the proposals made by the opponents. Proposals are negotiation formulas
like j : ϕ, where we assume that the opponent i is able to recognize the name label j
in j : ϕ and remove it in order to evaluate ϕ.
In general, negotiating agents may not share the same language but have different
signatures. Hence, when i evaluates an assertion by j, she first has to translate the sym-
bols occurring in it to symbols belonging to her signature. Such a translation depends,
of course, on the particular terms that are being considered for the negotiation, so we
assume abstractly that for each pair of agents (i, j) there is the translation function
τi,j such that:
τi,j : Σj → Σi .
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22:
Fig. 1 The EGG/YOLK representation of the opponent’s offer from agent i’s viewpoint iden-
tified by the plain lines, for call-away.
17: 21: 23: 29:
33: 36: 38: 39:
40: 41: 42d: 42e:
Fig. 2 The EGG/YOLK representation of the opponent’s offer from agent i’s viewpoint iden-
tified by the plain lines, for agreement.
1: 2: 3: 6:
8:
Fig. 3 The EGG/YOLK representation of the opponent’s offer from agent i’s viewpoint iden-
tified by the plain lines, for absolute disagreement.
When j asserts ϕ (i.e., j : ϕ), i is not able to find which part of ϕ is in the
stubbornness set of j, since she only knows that ϕ = stubj ∧ ψk where stubj is the
conjunction of all the formulas in  LSj and ψ
k is the kth angle of j.
In the following, we describe the main conditions an agent has to test in order to
evaluate the opponent proposal and to identify the negotiation condition she is in. We
suppose that j is the first proponent (bidding) agent and that i is the agent evaluating
j’s proposal. Figures 1, 2 3, 4, 5, and 6 show the EGG/YOLK representations in
which i is identified by the plain line and j by the dashed line for each condition that
i tests; the numbering is that of (Lehmann and Cohn, 1994). Let ϕ be the proposal of
j. When the MN begins the agent receiving the first proposal controls that it is not
too general and not too restrictive with respect to her viewpoint.
– If the received proposal ϕ is too general (stubi → τi,j(ϕ)), then the agent i can-
not negotiate with j because no generalization of her stubbornness knowledge is
acceptable. In this case i thinks they are in call-away and the negotiation ends in a
negative way. The corresponding EGG/YOLK representation is shown in Figure 1.
– Otherwise, in the case in which the received proposal ϕ is too restrictive (τi,j(ϕ)→
flex0i ) the only action i can perform is to re-initiate the MN by proposing her angle
that is a generalization of ϕ.
When both of the previous cases are negative, the agent i evaluates how much
acceptable is ϕ.
– The ideal situation is the agreement. As said before, a proposal is considered ac-
ceptable when it is equivalent to the current angle of i (flexki ↔ τi,j(ϕ)) or when it
is representable by means of a pair of feasible angles, (flexki → τi,j(ϕ))∧ (τi,j(ϕ)→
flexk+1i ). In our formalism, if flex
k
i → τi,j(ϕ) then there always exists flexk+1i
such that the previous condition is true because, as said in Section 2.2, for each
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4: 5: 7: 9:
10: 11: 12: 13:
25:
26: 27: 42a:
Fig. 4 The EGG/YOLK representation of the opponent’s offer from agent i’s viewpoint iden-
tified by the plain lines, for essence disagreement.
18: 24: 30: 34:
35: 37: 42c:
Fig. 5 The EGG/YOLK representation of the opponent’s offer from agent i’s viewpoint iden-
tified by the plain lines, for relative disagreement.
14: 15: 16: 19: 20:
28:
31: 32: 42b:
Fig. 6 The EGG/YOLK representation of the opponent’s offer from agent i’s viewpoint iden-
tified by the plain lines, for compatibility.
flexki there is a stubborn formula in  LSi that is a generalization of it. Thus,
flexki → τi,j(ϕ) and flexki → stubi yield τi,j(ϕ) → stubi. In fact, it is not possible
that stubi → τi,j(ϕ) because this is the call-away condition. Thus, the sufficient
condition to reach the agreement is flexki → τi,j(ϕ). The egg-yolk configurations
for agreement are depicted in Figure 2. When agents are not in agreement, they
disagree in many ways and i finds which type of disagreement is between ϕ and
her current angle flexki .
– If the proposal of j is not consistent with the stubbornness knowledge of agent i,
¬(stubi ∧ τi,j(ϕ)) then the agents are in absolute disagreement (Figure 3).
– If i and j are not in absolute disagreement, i’s CAF is consistent with respect to
j’s proposal, and there is no generalization/restriction relation between flexki and
ϕ, ¬(flexki ∧ τi,j(ϕ))∧ (stubi ∨ τi,j(ϕ)), then the agents are in essence disagreement
(Figure 4).
– If i and j are neither in essence nor in absolute disagreement and ϕ is a general-
ization of i’s CAF, (flexki → τi,j(ϕ)) ∧ ¬(τi,j(ϕ) → flexki ), then the agents are in
relative disagreement (Figure 5).
– If i and j are neither in absolute nor in relative disagreement, i’s CAF is consistent
with respect to ϕ, and i’s CAF is not a weakening of ϕ, (flexki ∨τi,j(ϕ))∧¬(flexki →
τi,j(ϕ)) ∧ ¬(τi,j(ϕ) → flexki ), then the agents are in the compatibility relation
(Figure 6).
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After evaluating the received proposal, an agent informs the opponent about the
negotiation situation she thinks to be in, in order to give to the opponent a motivation
of the potential disagreement, i.e. the non acceptability of her proposal. To this end,
we extend the formulas in the agent language:
Definition 4 ( Li extension) If ϕ is a proposal received by i in the negotiation pro-
cess, then it is a formula asserted by somebody as j : ϕ, with j 6= i. We extend the lan-
guage  Li with the formulas absDis(j : ϕ), essDis(j : ϕ), relDis(j : ϕ), comp(j : ϕ),
and agree(j : ϕ). For Aki = 〈Dki , Iki 〉 a Σi-structure, the semantics of these additional
formulas is:
– Aki |= absDis(j : ϕ) iff Aki |= ¬(stubi ∧ τi,j(ϕ));
– Aki |= essDis(j : ϕ) iff Aki |= (stubi ∨ τi,j(ϕ)) ∧ ¬(flexki ∧ τi,j(ϕ));
– Aki |= relDis(j : ϕ) iff Aki |= (flexki → τi,j(ϕ)) ∧ ¬(τi,j(ϕ)→ flexki );
– Aki |= comp(j : ϕ) iff Aki |= (flexki ∨ τi,j(ϕ)) ∧ ¬(flexki → τi,j(ϕ)) ∧ ¬(τi,j(ϕ) →
flexki );
– Aki |= agree(j : ϕ) iff Aki |= (flexki → τi,j(ϕ)).
We did not define a sentence callAway(j : ϕ) as the call-away condition interrupts
the MN. It is also important to remark that in our system we restrict the evaluation of
agent proposals to formulas in the basic agent language, so no assertion can be made by
agents using extended (and nested) formulas like agree(comp(j : ϕ)). This restriction
avoids nested MN processes.
In the two following subsections, we define the negotiation language and the de-
ductive rules for the MN process.
3.1 MN language
The negotiation language  L is built by the assertions of the agents during the negotia-
tion, i.e., labeled formulas i : ϕ meaning that agent i ∈ Ag asserts the formula ϕ ∈  Li.
That is, i : ϕ represents a proposal the agent i makes in the negotiation and typically
represents her CAF or the evaluation of ψ asserted by j when ϕ is R(j : ψ) where R
is one of the disagreement relations absDis, essDis, relDis.
Definition 5 (Σ-formula) The signature of the MN language  L is Σ = 〈P, {αi}i∈Ag〉
where P = ⋃i∈Ag Pi and αi : Pi → N is the arity function for predicate symbols. Let
ϕ be a  Li formula for some i ∈ Ag; then  L comprises of Σ-formulas defined as follows:
– i : ϕ is a Σ-formula;
– if ϕ1 and ϕ2 are Σ-formulas then ϕ1 ∩ ϕ2 is a Σ-formula.
Let N k = ({Aki }i∈Ag,k∈N,F) be a Σ-structure where {Aki }i∈Ag,k∈N is the domain
set and F is an evaluation function that maps name labels into Ag. Then:
– N k |= i : ϕ iff AkF(i) |= ϕ;
– N k |= ϕ1 ∩ ϕ2 iff N k |= ϕ1 and N k |= ϕ2.
We need only the conjunction operation because during the negotiation, the stream of
dialog begins with the proposal of the first bidding agent, that is the auctioneer in the
1 − n MN, and continues with pairs of offer evaluation and proposal of the following
proposing agents.
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A B
ϕ
absDis(ϕ), ψ
absDis(ψ), ϕ′
.
.
.
(a) A start.
A B
ϕ
comp(ϕ), ψ
absDis(ψ), ϕ′
.
.
.
(b) A violation.
Fig. 7 Two bilateral MN scenarios.
j : ϕ ¬(stubi ∧ τi,j(ϕ))
i : absDis(j : ϕ) ∩ i : flex1i
(AD)
j : ϕ ¬(flex0i ∧ τi,j(ϕ)) ∧ (stubi ∨ τi,j(ϕ)
i : essDis(j : ϕ) ∩ i : flex1i
(ED)
j : ϕ ¬(flex0i → τi,j(ϕ)) ∧ (τi,j(ϕ)→ flex0i )
i : flex0i
(I)
j : ϕ (flex0i → τi,j(ϕ))
i : agree(j : ϕ) ∩ i : τi,j(ϕ)
(Ag)
j : ϕ (flex0i ∨ τi,j(ϕ)) ∧ ¬(flex0i → τi,j(ϕ)) ∧ ¬(τi,j(ϕ)→ flex0i )
i : comp(j : ϕ) ∩ i : flex1i
(Co)
Table 2 Rules for the second proposing agent.
3.2 MN Rules
In this section, we provide the deductive rules for the MN process. We distinguish
between pairwise MN and one-to-many MN because in the latter case an agent behaves
differently when she is the auctioneer. Moreover, in a 1− n MN the supervisor system
ends the negotiation in a positive way when all or an acceptable part of the agents
share a common angle: in the former case the negotiation is totally positive and in the
latter it is partially positive.
3.2.1 MN Rules: 1-1 MN
We give the transition rules the agents use to negotiate depending on the mutual
negotiation position they test and on their flexibility; these rules are coupled with those
in Table 1. No rules are needed for the first proposing agent because she only makes
a proposal; conversely the second and the following proposing agents make proposals
and assert the evaluation of the received offer.
There are different rules for the second proposing agent and the following ones.
The second proposing agent has to check if the first proposal is too general or too
restrictive and thus if the negotiation has to end immediately in the former case (call-
away relation), or to re-initiate with a new proposal in the latter case ((I) rule).
Therefore, a following proposing agent receives proposals that are not restrictions of
her initial one and she has only to test if a received proposal is not too general.
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Consider the scenario in Figure 7(a): Alice (A) makes the proposal ϕ and Bob (B)
evaluates it, where B’s reasoning is based upon two tests:
1. The relation between his CAF and ϕ. B’s CAF may be in agreement (ϕ↔ flexkB)
or not with ϕ, and B recognizes it by testing the condition listed above.
2. His stubbornness condition, i.e., if his CAF is stubB (flex
k
B ↔ stubB) or not.
Whenever B is stubborn, he performs the same counterproposal, otherwise he may
relax his CAF by the (W ) rule of Table 1 (flexkB → flexk+1B ) or change his theory by
the (C) rule of Table 1 (¬(stubi ↔ flexki ) and ¬(flexki → flexk+1i ) and ¬(flexk+1i →
flexki )).
At the end of his evaluation, B replies to A with a counterproposal ψ. When A
evaluates ψ she has to consider the relation between her CAF and ψ, her stubborn-
ness condition (stubA ↔ flexkA) and B’s evaluation. The evaluation of the opponent
agent helps agents in choosing the new proposal. The choice of the action, weakening
or changing theory, and of the next proposal depends on the agent’s attitude: a col-
laborative agent chooses the proposal that improves the negotiation relation with the
opponent, whereas a competitive agent chooses the proposal that changes the least the
relation with the opponent. For instance, if B says to A that when A proposes ϕ they
are in essence disagreement, and B makes the proposal ψ, A will propose ϕ1 or ϕ2,
both inferred from ϕ by applying (W) or (C). When A is collaborative, she will propose
ϕ1 because she knows that they will be in agreement. Conversely, A will propose ϕ2,
if A is competitive, because she knows that they will remain in essence disagreement.
Suppose B says to A that when A proposes ϕ they are in relative disagreement
(ψ → ϕ) and B makes the proposal ψ, then A knows that they are in agreement when
she proposes ψ.
To support the interaction sketched above, we define the system MND to consist
of the standard introduction and elimination rules for the connectives of  Li and  L,
and of two sets of rules: one set for the second proposing agent (Table 2) and another
set for the following proposing agents (Table 3). For the sake of space, we omit the
assumption of non call-away conditions in negotiation rules and explain only some of
the rules by example.
Assume that A begins a MN by proposing flex0A to B. B evaluates τB,A(flex
0
A)
with respect to his initial angle flex0B and suppose B thinks that τB,A(flex
0
A) is too
strict, i.e., τB,A(flex
0
A) → flex0B . Thus, B cannot accept τB,A(flex0A) and re-initiates
the MN by the rule (I) and proposes flex0B by B : flex
0
B . Otherwise, suppose B thinks
that τB,A(flex
0
A) is entailed by his initial angle flex
0
B and that τB,A(flex
0
A) is not too
general, i.e., it is not entailed by stubB . In this case, B knows that A cannot accept
flex0B because it is too strict with respect to her viewpoint (explained in the beginning
of Section 3), thus if B accepts τB,A(flex
0
A) by (Ag) because it satisfies the precondition
(flex0B → τB,A(flex0A)), and says B : agree(A : flex0A). This is the reason why there is
no rule (RD) in Table 2 for relative disagreement relation. Consider the case in which
B thinks that the proposal of A, flex0A, is consistent to his initial angle flex
0
B by (Co).
B says to A that they are in the compatibility relation by B : comp(A : flex0A) and
makes a new proposal B : flex1B such that flex
0
B → flex1B (rule (W )). Now A thinks that
τA,B(flex
1
B) is an acceptable angle of her initial viewpoint, i.e. flex
1
A ↔ τA,B(flex1B).
Thus A agrees with B and says A : agree(B : flex1B) by (Co-Ag). It may be the
case that agents make proposals that become inconsistent with the received one. This
inconsistency is tested by the opponent agent, not by the bidding one, because in MND
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agents choose the new proposal only with respect to their angles and not with respect
to the opponent’s one.
Consider now the scenario in Figure 7(b). B evaluates the proposal of A, tests the
compatibility relation, and makes the counterproposal. A evaluates it and finds they
are inconsistent. In situations like this, agents perform proposals that violate the MN
relation among agents; we call such a proposal a violation and the rule causing it a
violation rule. In Table 3, the violation rules are (ED-AD) and (ED-Co).
The MN develops by agents making proposals and asserting if they are in agreement
or not. The entire process is controlled by a supervisor, an external viewpoint, which
tests if the MN ends and if the outcome is positive or negative. Table 4 shows the
transition rules for the system. We write
– j : na(i : ϕ) to say that agent j thinks she is not in agreement with i : ϕ, and
– ∗(i, j) to say whatever the system state is different from the final ones (Agreement
and Disagreement), i.e., whether the system is in Init or Negotiate.
The MN begins when agents make proposals in turns (i : ϕ, j : ψ) and they are
not in agreement (j : na(i : ϕ)) by (N). The MN ends with a positive outcome (ϕ)
when each agent agrees on a proposal (j : agree(i : ϕ)), otherwise the MN ends with a
negative outcome if there are no more proposals to perform (stubi ↔ ϕ and stubj ↔ ψ)
and agents do not agree on a common acceptable angle (j : na(i : ϕ)).
Example 4 Let Alice and Bob be two agents negotiating the definition of the term
“vehicle” as in Example 1. Suppose that the initial viewpoint of Alice is
flex0A = has2wheels ∧ hasSteeringWheel ∧ (hasMotor ∨ has2bicyclePedals)
and her stubbornness knowledge is as in Example 3. Suppose that Bob’s initial view-
point is
flex0B = has2wheels ∧ hasHandlebar ∧ has2bicyclePedals
and his stubbornness knowledge is
stubB = (has2wheels ∨ has3wheels ∨ has4wheels) ∧
(hasHandlebar ∨ hasSteeringWheel) ∧
(hasMotor ∨ has2bicyclePedals ∨ has4bicyclePedals)
Alice is the first bidding agent and she proposes flex0A to Bob, who receives the proposal
and evaluates it. Bob tests that they are in compatibility because (flex0B∨τB,A(flex0A))∧
¬(flex0B → τB,A(flex0A)) ∧ ¬(τB,A(flex0A) → flex0B). Bob chooses the new CAF by a
weakening action (W ) in
flex1B = (has2wheels ∨ has4wheels) ∧
(hasHandlebar ∨ hasSteeringWheel) ∧ has2bicyclePedals
Bob uses the (Co) rule and sends his CAF to Alice:
A : flex0A (flex
0
B ∨ τB,A(flex0A)) ∧ ¬(flex0B → τB,A(flex0A)) ∧ ¬(τB,A(flex0A)→ flex0B)
B : comp(A : flex0A) ∩ B : flex1B
(Co)
The system continues the MN by:
∗(A,B) A : flex0A B : comp(A : flex0A) B : flex1B
Negotiate(A,B)
(N)
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A B
flex0A
comp(flex0A),flex
1
B
relDis(flex1B),flex
1
A
agree(flex1A),flex
1
A
(a) Message passing
from conf.31 to conf.31
from conf.31 to conf.38
from conf.38 to conf.41
(b) EGG/YOLK configurations changing
Fig. 8 The MN scenario of Example 4: the message passing flow (a) and the changes of the
EGG/YOLKs of the agents (b). Alice is identified by plain lines and Bob by dashed lines.
White yolks represent the precedent proposal of the agent and the dotted gray yolk is the
positive outcome of the scenario.
Alice receives flex1B and she has to make a weakening or a changing theory action
because Bob did not say they were in agreement nor in relative disagreement. Alice
performs a changing theory action by the rule (C) and her CAF is
flex1A = has2wheels ∧ (hasHandlebar ∨ hasSteeringWheel) ∧ has2bicyclePedals
Alice thinks they are in relative disagreement since (flex1A → τA,B(flex1B))∧¬(τA,B(flex1B)→
flex1A), and she uses the rule (Co-RD) to inform Bob that they are in relative disagree-
ment:
B : comp(A : flex0A) ∩ B : flex1B (flex1A → τA,B(flex1B)) ∧ ¬(τA,B(flex1B)→ flex1A)
A : relDis(B : flex1B) ∩ A : flex1A
(Co-RD)
The system continues the MN by:
∗(B,A) B : flex1B A : relDis(B : flex1B) A : flex1A
Negotiate(B,A)
(N)
Bob receives flex1A and he accepts it because Alice said they are in relative disagree-
ment.
A : relDis(B : flex1B) ∩ A : flex1A
B : agree(A : flex1A) ∩ B : τB,A(flex1A)
(RD-Ag)
The system closes the MN by:
∗(A,B) A : flex1A B : agree(A : flex1A)
Agreement(A,B)
(A)
with a positive outcome, flex1A.
Fig. 13 shows the message flow between Alice and Bob (Fig. 8(a)), and the changes
of their EGG/YOLK configurations (Fig. 8(b)). 
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The classification of the agreement conditions provided above is complete, in the
sense that there is no other possible configuration of EGG/YOLKs, as shown by
Lehmann and Cohn in (1994). Based on the completeness of that analysis, we can
show the following results.
Theorem 1 MND for bilateral MN is consistent.
Proof Consider two agents represented in the MND system with sets  LS1 and  LS2 of
stubbornness formulas and sets  LF1 and  LF2 of flexible formulas. To prove that MND
is consistent, we show that if a Σi formula ξ is inferred using the MND rules, or, in
other terms, is deduced as a theorem in the system, then ξ represents a proposal that
is acceptable by both agents. In other words, we aim at proving that when the rules
yield ξ then ξ generalizes both  LF1 and  LF2 and is generalized by both  LS1 and  LS2 .
To prove this, we need to show that:
(i) The rules for making new proposals yield a relation that is acceptable from the
viewpoint of the agent who made the proposal before and infer a new proposal again
still acceptable. In other terms, if an agent makes a proposal that is generalized by the
set of stubbornness formulas  LSi , and is a generalization of the set of flexible formulas
 LFi , for one agent, the rules infer a new proposal that is in the same relationships with
 LSi and  LFi .
(ii) The rules for the second proposing agent infer the relation between the agents
at that step of the negotiation.
(iii) The rules for the following proposing agent do the same as the rules for the
second proposing agent, taking into account that this step takes place after the step of
the second proposing agent.
(iv) The system transition rules close the negotiation only when the proposal is
acceptable by both agents, namely generalizes both  LFi and is generalized by both
 LSi sets.
Let us now consider a formula ξ that is acceptable by the two agents, and let us
consider the rules that produce transitions in the system. In particular, if ξ is inferred
by means of one of the rules (AD), (ED), (I), (Co), (Ag) for the second proposing
agent, or by means of one of the rules given in Fig. 3 for the following proposing agent,
then the possible results of the step described above are given by the application of
the system transition rules. Evidently, if ξ is inferred, then the rule (D) does not
apply. If (N) applies, and one more inference is performed, then the rules (W ), (C),
(S) allow us to infer a different formula. Suppose now, by contradiction, that the
new formula ξ is not acceptable by one of the agents (in the sense that either is not
a generalization of her set of flexible formulas or it is not generalized by the set of
stubbornness formulas. As a consequence, one agent has called herself away, as we
stated above. This, however, is impossible, by construction of the rules for the second
and following proposals. Conversely, if the transition rule (D) applies and, therefore,
the agents have incompatible viewpoints, then ξ is not inferred through the system,
because it is not a generalization of both flexible sets of formulas and generalizes by
both stubbornness sets of formulas. Clearly, by means of the full set of rules, it is not
possible to do so when the agents have consistent viewpoints. 
We say that a deductive system is adequate to represent a MN between two agents
when it infers an outcome iff an agreement is reachable between the agents, otherwise
it does not produce any result.
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Definition 6 A deductive system R is adequate to represent the MN process between
two agents, i and j, when
R infers
{
ϕ iff for all x ∈ Ag there exists k ∈ N s.t. Akx |= (flexkx → ϕ) ∧ (ϕ→ stubx)
⊥ otherwise
where Ag = {i, j} and ϕ ∈ ⋃x∈Ag  Lx.
Theorem 2 MND is adequate to represent the MN of two agents.
Proof We consider two agents that have consistent viewpoints, namely such that there
exists a possible common angle. Their stubbornness sets and their flexible sets of for-
mulas are in one of the EGG/YOLK configurations except number 1. Suppose now
that the MND system infers a Σi formula ξ. Then, ξ is a common angle. Conversely,
suppose that MND does not infer any Σi formula. Then, the agents are in call-away
situation. Suppose now that the two agents have inconsistent viewpoints (configuration
1). The relation established is absolute disagreement. The result is that no formula can
be inferred through the system, which is consistent by Theorem 1. Hence, overall, the
system is adequate. 
For MN processes that are built on finite signature theories, we obtain the following
decidability result:
Corollary 1 MN is decidable for theories with finite signature under the assumption
of competitive agents.
Proof Consider an MN between competitive agents on a language with finite signature.
The number of possible proposals the agents can exchange during a MN process is
formed by the possible formulas that can be built on the signature, which is finite.
Since the rules of MND are finite and the new possible proposals are finite, and the
number of applications of each rule is limited to the number of proposals the other
negotiator can perform, the number of steps that will be performed, in any algorithmic
solution to the problem, is finite as well. 
In the following section, we extend the MND for 1-n MN in which one agent is the
referee.
3.2.2 MN Rules: 1-n MN
When the Meaning Negotiation involves more than two agents, it may be viewed as
an English Auction Game. An agent behaves differently if she is the auctioneer or not.
The referee is the agent who receives all the proposals of the others and finds which
one is shared by the agents. The auctioneer is a player himself; he makes a proposal at
each new bid. The auctioneer replicates the same proposal to each of the negotiating
agents. As a 1-1 MN player, the auctioneer evaluates each received proposal by testing
the validity of the conditions listed above: he checks the relation between each received
proposal and his stubbornness knowledge and his flexible one. An auctioneer differs
from the other negotiating agents in the number of the evaluations he has to do.
Moreover, when the auctioneer infers the next proposal to perform by the weakening
or the changing rules, the proposal may be related in more ways than that of the
proposal made by other agents. In fact, in 1-1 MN it is not possible to reach the absolute
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disagreement by a relative disagreement situation because, when an agent i informs
her opponent j that they are in relative disagreement, then j knows that i proposed
one of i’s CAF that is a restriction of her CAF and j accepts it. Instead, in 1-n MN,
the previous situations may raise: the auctioneer may not accept the proposal of one
of the negotiating agents who said that they are in relative disagreement, because the
proposal is not shared by the other agents. The set of deductive rules for the auctioneer
is an extension of those in Table 3 with those in Table 5. In particular, all the added
rules are violations and they represent the changing of the negotiation situation from
relative disagreement to the relations of absolute disagreement, essence disagreement
and compatibility, and from agreement to all the possible relations between agents:
absolute disagreement, essence disagreement, compatibility, relative disagreement and
agreement. The rule (Ag-Ag) is not only for the auctioneer but also for negotiating
agents and it is used by them whenever the auctioneer proposes an acceptable angle.
Moreover, the system transition rules are different from the 1-1 MN ones (Table 4)
because the agreement and disagreement conditions are different. In particular, the
test of the agreement condition needs to count the number of agreeing agents. The 1-n
MN ends in:
– disagreement when all the agents involved are in stubbornness and no agreement
is found yet;
– agreement when all the agents or an acceptable part of them, i.e. α agents where
α is the degree of sharing, agree about a common angle.
In all the other cases, the MN continues. The system transition rules for 1-n MN
are in Table 6. The following example shows a simple 1-n MN ending negatively or
positively depending on the sharing degree decided in front of the beginning of the
MN.
Example 5 Let Alice, Bob and Charles be three agents negotiating the definition of
the term “vehicle”. Suppose that the initial viewpoint of Alice is
flex0A = has3wheels ∧ hasSteeringWheel ∧ hasMotor
and her stubbornness knowledge is
stubA = (has3wheels ∨ has4wheels) ∧ hasSteeringWheel
∧(hasMotor ∨ has2bicyclePedals ∨ has4bicyclePedals)
Suppose that Bob’s initial viewpoint is
flex0B = has2wheels ∧ hasHandlebar ∧ has2bicyclePedals
and that his stubbornness knowledge is
stubB = (has2wheels ∨ has4wheels) ∧ (hasSteeringWheel ∨ hasHandlebar) ∧
(hasMotor ∨ has2bicyclePedals ∨ has4bicyclePedals)
and that the initial viewpoint of Charles is
flex0C = has4wheels ∧ hasHandlebar ∧ hasTowBar
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and his stubbornness knowledge is
stubC = has4wheels ∧ (hasHandlebar ∨ hasSteeringWheel) ∧
(hasTowBar ∨ hasMotor)
Moreover, suppose that the MN is considered positive iff all the agents agree with a
common angle, i.e there are α = 3 agreeing agents. Alice is the first bidding agent, and
thus she is the referee, and she proposes flex0A to Bob and Charles. Bob and Charles
receive the proposal and evaluate it. Bob tests that they are in essence disagreement
because (stubB ∨ τB,A(flex0A))∧¬(flex0B ∧ τB,A(flex0A)). Bob chooses the new CAF by
a changing theory action (C) in
flex1B = (has2wheels ∨ has4wheels) ∧
hasSteeringWheel ∧ (has2bicyclePedals ∨ hasMotor)
Bob uses the (ED) rule and sends his CAF to Alice:
A : flex0A (stubB ∨ τB,A(flex0A)) ∧ ¬(flex0B ∧ τB,A(flex0A))
B : essDis(A : flex0A) ∩ B : flex1B
(ED)
Charles evaluates flex0A and tests that they are in essence disagreement because (stubC∨
τC,A(flex
0
A)) ∧ ¬(flex0C ∧ τC,A(flex0A)). Charles chooses the new CAF by a changing
theory action (C) in
flex1C = has4wheels ∧ hasSteeringWheel ∧ hasTowBar
Charles uses the (ED) rule and sends his CAF to Alice:
A : flex0A (stubC ∨ τC,A(flex0A)) ∧ ¬(flex0C ∧ τC,A(flex0A))
C : essDis(A : flex0A) ∩ C : flex1C
(ED)
The system continues the MN by:
∗(A,B,C) A : flex0A B : essDis(A : flex0A) C : essDis(A : flex0A) |{A}| ≤ α
Negotiate(A,B,C)
(NN)
Alice receives flex1B and flex
1
C , and she has to make a weakening or a changing theory
action because Bob and Charles did not say they were in agreement nor in relative
disagreement. Alice performs a changing theory action by the rule (C) and her CAF is
flex1A = has4wheels ∧ hasSteeringWheel ∧ (hasMotor ∨ has2bicyclePedals)
Alice thinks she is in relative disagreement relation with Bob since (flex1A → τA,B(flex1B))∧
¬(τA,B(flex1B)→ flex1A).
Alice thinks she is in compatibility relation with Charles since (flex1A∨τA,C(flex1C))∧
(flex1A → τA,C(flex1C)) ∧ ¬(τA,C(flex1C)→ flex1A).
Alice uses the rule (ED-RD) to inform Bob they are in relative disagreement and
(ED-Co) to inform Charles that they are in compatibility:
B : essDis(A : flex0A) ∩ B : flex1B
(flex1A → τA,B(flex1B)) ∧ ¬(τA,B(flex1B)→ flex1A)
A : relDis(B : flex1B) ∩ A : flex1A
(ED-RD)
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and
C : comp(A : flex0A) ∩ C : stubC
(flex1A ∨ τA,C(flex1C)) ∧ ¬(flex1A → τA,C(flex1C)) ∧ ¬(τA,C(flex1C)→ flex1A)
A : essDis(C : flex1C) ∩ A : flex1A
(ED-Co)
Bob receives flex1A and he is in agreement with Alice by (RD-Ag):
A : relDis(B : flex1B) ∩ A : flex1A
B : agree(A : flex1A) ∩ B : τB,A(flex1A)
(RD-Ag)
Charles receives the proposal and evaluates it. Charles chooses the new CAF by a
weakening action (C rule) in
flex2C = has4wheels ∧ (hasHandlebar ∨ hasSteeringWheel) ∧ (hasMotor ∨ hasTowbar)
and flex2C = stubC . Charles tests that he is in compatibility relation with Alice since
(stubC ∨ τC,A(flex1A)) ∧ ¬(stubC → τC,A(flex1A)) ∧ ¬(τC,A(flex1A) → stubC) and uses
the (Co-Co) rule to send his CAF to Alice:
A : comp(C : stubC) ∩ A : flex1A
(stubC ∨ τC,A(flex1A)) ∧ ¬(stubC → τC,A(flex1A)) ∧ ¬(τC,A(flex1A)→ stubC)
C : comp(A : flex1A) ∩ C : stubC
(Co-Co)
The system continues the MN by:
∗(A,B,C) A : flex0A B : agree(A : flex1A) C : comp(A : flex1A) |{A,B}| ≤ α
Negotiate(A,B,C)
(NN)
Alice receives τB,A(flex
1
A) and stubC from Bob and Charles respectively and she has
to make a weakening or a changing theory action because Charles did not say he was
in agreement nor in relative disagreement with her. Alice performs a changing theory
action by the rule (C) and her CAF is
flex2A = has4wheels ∧ hasSteeringWheel ∧ (has4bicyclePedals ∨ hasMotor)
Alice thinks she is in compatibility relation with Bob and Charles since (flex2A ∨
τA,B(τB,A(flex
1
A))) ∧ ¬(flex2A → τA,B(τB,A(flex1A))) ∧ ¬(τA,B(τB,A(flex1A))→ flex2A)
and (flex2A ∨ τA,C(stubC)) ∧ ¬(flex2A → τA,C(stubC)) ∧ ¬(τA,C(stubC)→ flex2A).
Alice uses the rule (Ag-Co) to inform Bob she is in compatibility with him:
B : agree(A : flex1A) ∩ B : τB,A(flex1A)
(flex2A ∨ τA,B(τB,A(flex1A))) ∧ ¬(flex2A → τA,B(τB,A(flex1A))) ∧ ¬(τA,B(τB,A(flex1A))→ flex2A)
A : comp(B : τB,A(flex
1
A)) ∩ A : τA,B(τB,A(flex1A))
(Ag-Co)
and the rule (Co-Co) to inform Charles she is in compatibility with him:
C : comp(A : flex1A) ∩ C : stubC
(flex2A ∨ τA,C(stubC)) ∧ ¬(flex2A → τA,C(stubC)) ∧ ¬(τA,C(stubC)→ flex2A)
A : comp(C : stubC) ∩ A : flex2A
(Co-Co)
Bob receives flex2A and he makes a weakening action by the rule W and his CAF is:
flex3B = (has2wheels ∨ has4wheels) ∧ (hasSteeringWheel ∨ hasHandlebar) ∧
(hasMotor ∨ has2bicyclePedals ∨ has4bicyclePedals)
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and flex3B = stubB . Bob uses the rule (Co-Co) and sends stubB to Alice.
A : comp(B : flex2B) ∩ A : flex2A
(stubB ∨ τB,A(flex2A)) ∧ ¬(stubB → τB,A(flex2A)) ∧ ¬(τB,A(flex2A)→ stubB)
B : comp(A : flex2A) ∩ B : stubB
(Co-Co)
Charles receives the proposal and evaluates it. Charles is in stubbornness thus he
applies the (S) rule and proposes stubC to Alice.
Charles uses the (Co-Co) rule and sends his CAF to Alice:
A : comp(C : stubC) ∩ A : flex2A
(stubC ∨ τC,A(flex2A)) ∧ ¬(stubC → τC,A(flex2A)) ∧ ¬(τC,A(flex2A)→ stubC)
C : comp(A : flex2A) ∩ C : stubC
(Co-Co)
The system continues the MN by:
∗(A,B,C) A : flex2A B : comp(A : flex2A) C : comp(A : flex2A) |{A}| ≤ α
Negotiate(A,B,C)
(NN)
Alice receives stubB and stubC and she has to make a weakening or a changing theory
action because Charles did not say he was in agreement nor in relative disagreement
with her. Alice performs a weakening action by the rule (W ) and her CAF is
flex3A = (has3wheels ∨ has4wheels) ∧ hasSteeringWheel
∧(hasMotor ∨ has2bicyclePedals ∨ has4bicyclePedals)
and flex3A = stubA.
Alice thinks she is in compatibility relation with Bob since (stubA∨τA,B(stubB))∧
(stubA → τA,B(stubB)) ∧ ¬(τA,B(stubB)→ stubA).
Moreover, Alice thinks she is in compatibility relation with Charles since (stubA ∨
τA,C(stubC)) ∧ (stubA → τA,C(stubC)) ∧ ¬(τA,C(stubC)→ stubA).
Alice uses the (Co-Co) rule to inform Bob and Charles that they are in compati-
bility relation:
B : comp(A : flex2A) ∩ B : stubB
(stubA ∨ τA,B(stubB)) ∧ ¬(stubA → τA,B(stubB)) ∧ ¬(τA,B(stubB)→ stubA)
A : comp(B : stubB) ∩ A : stubA
(Co-Co)
and
C : comp(A : flex2A) ∩ C : stubC
(stubA ∨ τA,C(stubC)) ∧ ¬(stubA → τA,C(stubC)) ∧ ¬(τA,C(stubC)→ stubA)
A : comp(C : stubC) ∩ A : stubA
(Co-Co)
Bob and Charles receive the proposal and evaluate it. They are in stubbornness thus
they apply the (S) rule and they propose stubB and stubC to Alice respectively.
They use the (Co-Co) rule and send their CAFs to Alice:
A : comp(B : stubB) ∩ A : stubA
(stubB ∨ τB,A(stubA)) ∧ ¬(stubB → τB,A(stubA)) ∧ ¬(τB,A(stubA)→ stubB)
B : comp(A : stubA) ∩ B : stubB
(Co-Co)
and
A : comp(C : stubC) ∩ A : stubA
(stubC ∨ τC,A(stubA)) ∧ ¬(stubC → τC,A(stubA)) ∧ ¬(τC,A(stubA)→ stubC)
C : comp(A : stubA) ∩ C : stubC
(Co-Co)
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The system closes the MN by:
∗(A,B,C) A : stubA B : comp(A : stubA) C : agree(A : stubA)
|{A}| ≤ α for all i ∈ Ag.i : ψ and stubi ↔ ψ
Disagreement(A,B,C)
(DD)
with a negative outcome. The negotiation would be positively ending by rule (AA)
whether the sharing degree were α = 2 when Alice proposes A : flex1A to Bob and
Charles. 
As for the rules for bilateral MN, we can show the consistency and adequateness
of the rules for 1-n MN.
Theorem 3 MND for 1-n MN is consistent.
Proof Consider n agents represented in the MND system with sets  LS1 , . . . ,  LSn of
stubbornness formulas and sets  LF1 , . . . ,  LFn of flexible formulas. The proof of the
consistency of MND for 1-n MN is similar to the proof of Theorem 1. We show that
if a Σi formula ξ is inferred using the MND 1-n rules, or, in other terms, is deduced
as a theorem in the system, then ξ represents a proposal that is acceptable by all
or at least α agents. In other words, we aim at proving that when the rules yield
ξ then ξ generalizes at least α languages among  LF1 , . . . ,  LFn and is generalized by
at least α languages among  LS1 , . . . ,  LSn . Let us now consider a formula ξ that is
acceptable by at least α agents, and let us consider the rules that produce transitions
in the system. In particular, if ξ is inferred by means of one of the rules (AD), (ED),
(I), (Co), (Ag) for the second proposing agent, or by means of one of the rules given
in Fig. 3 or in Fig. 5 for the following proposing agent and the auctioneer, then the
possible results of the step described above are given by the application of the system
transition rules. Evidently, if ξ is inferred, then the rule (DD) does not apply. If (NN)
applies, and one more inference is performed, then the rules (W ), (C), (S) allow us to
infer a different formula. Suppose now, by contradiction, that the new formula ξ is not
acceptable by more than n−α agents (in the sense that either it is not a generalization
of their set of flexible formulas or it is not generalized by their sets of stubbornness
formulas). As a consequence, these agents have called themselves away, as we stated
above. This, however, is impossible, by construction of the rules for the second and
following proposals, and for the auctioneer. Conversely, if the transition rule (DD)
applies and, therefore, more than n−α agents have incompatible viewpoints, then ξ is
not inferred through the system, because it is not a generalization of the flexible sets
of formulas and generalizes by the stubbornness sets of formulas of at least α agents.
Clearly, by means of the full set of rules, it is not possible to do so when the agents
have consistent viewpoints. 
We say that a deductive system is adequate to represent a MN between n agents
when it infers an outcome iff an agreement is reachable among the agents otherwise it
does not produce any result.
Definition 7 A deductive system R is adequate to represent the MN process among
n agents when
R infers

ϕ iff there exists Ag′ ⊆ Ag s.t. | Ag′ |= m ≥ α and for all i ∈ Ag′
there exists k ∈ N s.t. Aki |= (flexki → ϕ) ∧ (ϕ→ stubi)
⊥ otherwise
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where Ag is the set of the agents with | Ag |= n, ϕ ∈ ⋃i∈Ag  Li and α is the minimum
number of agreeing agents to consider positive the outcome of the MN.
Theorem 4 MND is adequate to represent the MN of n agents.
Proof We consider n agents of which m agents have consistent viewpoints where n ≥
m ≥ α, namely such that there exists a possible common angle. Their stubbornness sets
and their flexible sets of formulas are pairwise in one of the EGG/YOLK configurations
except number 1. Suppose now that the MND system infers a Σi formula ξ. Then, ξ
is a common angle for at least α agents. Conversely, suppose that MND does not infer
any Σi formula. Then, some of the m agents are in call-away situation with the received
proposal. Suppose now that there are more than n-α agents having pairwise inconsistent
viewpoints (configuration 1). The relation established is absolute disagreement. The
result is that no formula can be inferred through the system, which is consistent by
Theorem 3. Hence, overall, the system is adequate. 
3.3 MN Process Development
In this section, we show how the MN process develops in terms of the changing of the
relations between the EGG/YOLKs of the agents. We model the multiparty MN among
n agents as an English Auction Game in which the auctioneer negotiates simultaneously
with n− 1 agents so that it can be considered as n− 1 bilateral MNs. For this reason
we show here how the relation of the EGG/YOLKs changes during a MN process only
for bilateral MN. As said above, the stubborn knowledge of the agents never changes
during the negotiation but only the flexible part may differ from one step to the next
one of a MN. The evolution of the relations between the EGG/YOLKs is different when
the stubborn knowledge of the agents are inconsistent, or in a generalization relation,
or just consistent or equivalent. We show below the MN development in all the cases.
Agents in MN make offers flex such that for each agent i:
flex i = stubi ∧ ϕ
where stubi is the stubbornness knowledge formula and ϕ is the flexible part of flex i.
Whenever an agent receive the opponent proposal, she does not know which is its
flexible part and which the stubbornness one. She only knows which is the relation of
the received proposal with respect to her own stubbornness and flexible knowledge.
Only the supervisor system knows the stubbornness knowledge of all the agents. As
said above, the stubbornness knowledge is unquestionable and it never changes during
the negotiation. Therefore, the MN process can be represented as a path of a graph in
which nodes are the EGG/YOLK configurations and edges are the result of the usage
of a bidding rule (Table 2 and Table 3).
Suppose that the agents have inconsistent stubbornness knowledge; whatever the
deductive rules they use, they remain related as in configuration number 1 and the
knowledge is described by a logical formula involving the stubbornness formulas of the
agents (see Table 7).
In the following subsections, we describe all the MN situations with respect to the
relations of the stubbornness knowledge of the agents.
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3.3.1 Equivalent Stubbornness Knowledge
Suppose that the agents have equivalent stubbornness sets. Then
stubi ↔ stubj
The relations between two sets are defined by means of the intersection of their
interiors and their exteriors. Given two sets, there are, in theory, two relations between
their interiors (either the set intersection is empty or not), two between their exteriors
and two relations between the interior of one of them and the exterior of the other one.
The possible configurations are then eight, but some of them are absurd (for instance
when the intersection of the interiors in empty, the intersection of the exteriors cannot
be empty, and vice versa. This presentation issues have been studied deeply in the past
and summarised in the spatial reasoning framework known as the Region Connection
Calculus (RCC-5). This calculus provides five relations for the cases in which the sets
coincide (EQ), two order relations of proper part (PP and PP−1), the relation of
proper overlapping (PO) and the relation of dijointness (DR). The equivalence relation
between stubbornness theories relations (RCC5) by EQ.
In Table 8, we show the possible yolk configurations and we give a statement
representing the configuration, i.e. the negotiation state.
Configuration Formula
42a
(stubi ↔ stubj) ∧ ¬(flex i ∧ flex j) ∧ (flex i → stubj) ∧
(flex j → stubi)
42b
(stubi ↔ stubj) ∧ (flex i ∨ flex j) ∧ ¬(flex i → flex j) ∧
¬(flex j → flex i) ∧ (flex i → stubj) ∧ (flex j → stubi)
42c
(stubi ↔ stubj) ∧ (flex i → flex j) ∧ (flex i → stubj) ∧
(flex j → stubi)
42d
(stubi ↔ stubj) ∧ (flex j → flex i) ∧ (flex i → stubj) ∧
(flex j → stubi)
42e (stubi ↔ stubj) ∧ (flex i ↔ flex j) ∧ (flex i → stubj) ∧
(flex j → stubi)
Table 8: Configurations for equivalent stubbornness sets. Agent i is iden-
tified by plain lines and agent j by dashed lines.
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42e
42d42c
42b
42a
Fig. 9 Transition graph for equivalent stubbornness knowledge. Nodes are coloured: the gray
node is the configuration of the positive outcome of the negotiation process.
Figure 9 depicts the graph of the possible negotiation relations of the agents dur-
ing the negotiation. The nodes are the EGG/YOLK configurations and the edges are
coloured by the agent who makes the next bid. The gray node identifies the positive
outcome of the negotiation.
All the rules the agents use when their stubbornness knowledge are equivalent are
legitimate. A rule is legitimate when it can be used in a specific configuration. In the
following example, we show how deductive rules of MND are used and their effects
in the EGG/YOLK configurations when the stubbornness knowledge of agents are
equivalent.
Example 6 Suppose Alice and Bob are related as in configuration 42a. Alice, A, is the
first bidding agent and she proposes flex0A to Bob, B. Bob receives the proposal and
evaluates it. Bob tests that they are in essence disagreement and generalizes his initial
viewpoint flex0B by:
flex0B → flex1B ¬(stubB ↔ flex0B)
flex1B
(W )
and he checks the provisional negotiation situation by:
A : flex0A ¬(flex0B ∧ τB,A(flex0A)) ∧ (stubB ∨ τB,A(flex0A)
B : essDis(A : flex0A) ∩B : flex1B
(ED)
Bob says to Alice that they are in essence disagreement and makes a proposal flex1B .
The system continues the MN by:
∗(A,B) A : flex0A B : essDis(A : flex0A) B : flex1B
Negotiate(A,B)
(N)
Alice receives flex1B and she makes a weakening or a changing action because Bob
said they are not in agreement nor in relative disagreement. Suppose Alice generalizes
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her CAF by:
flex0A → flex1A ¬(stubA ↔ flex0A)
flex1A
(W )
Alice tests the negotiation relation by:
B : essDis(A : flex0A) ∩B : flex1B
(flex1A ∨ τA,B(flex1B)) ∧ ¬(flex1A → τA,B(flex1B)) ∧ ¬(τA,B(flex1B)→ flex1A)
A : comp(B : flex1B) ∩A : flex1A
(ED-Co)
Alice says to Bob that they are in compatibility and makes a proposal flex1A.
The system continues the MN by:
∗(B,A) B : flex1B A : comp(B : flex1B) A : flex1A
Negotiate(B,A)
(N)
Bob receives flex1A and he makes a weakening or a changing action because Alice
said they are not in agreement nor in relative disagreement. Suppose Bob changes his
CAF by:
flex1B ¬(stubB ↔ flex1B) ¬(flex1B → flex2B) ¬(flex2B → flex1B)
flex2B
(C)
Bob tests the negotiation relation by:
A : comp(B : flex1B) ∩A : flex1A
(flex2A ∨ τB,A(flex1A)) ∧ ¬(flex2A → τB,A(flex1A)) ∧ ¬(flex2A ← τB,A(flex1A))
B : comp(A : flex1A) ∩B : flex2B
(Co-Co)
Bob says to Alice that they are in compatibility and makes a proposal flex2B .
The system continues the MN by:
∗(A,B) A : flex1A B : comp(A : flex1A) B : flex2B
Negotiate(A,B)
(N)
Alice receives flex2B and she makes a weakening or a changing action because Bob
said they are not in agreement nor in relative disagreement. Suppose Alice changes her
CAF by:
flex2A ¬(stubA ↔ flex2A) ¬(flex2A → flex3A) ¬(flex3A → flex2A)
flex3A
(C)
Alice tests the negotiation relation by:
B : comp(A : flex2A) ∩B : flex2B (flex3A → τA,B(flex3B))
A : agree(B : flex2A) ∩A : τA,B(flex2B)
(Co-Ag)
Alice says to Bob that they are in agreement and that they have a common angle that
is flex2B .
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A B
flex0A
essDis(flex0A),flex
1
B
comp(flex1B),flex
1
A
comp(flex1A),flex
2
B
agree(flex2B),flex
2
B
(a) Message passing
from conf.42a to conf.42a
from conf.42a to conf.42b
from conf.20 to conf.27
from conf.42b to conf.42e
(b) EGG/YOLK configuration changing
Fig. 10 A MN scenario between Alice and Bob with equivalent stubbornness knowledge: the
message passing flow (a) and the changes of their CAFs (b). Alice is identified by plain lines
and Bob by dashed lines. White yolks represent the precedent proposal of the agent and the
dotted yolk is the positive outcome of the scenario.
The system closes the MN by:
∗(B,A) B : flex2B A : agree(B : flex2B)
Agreement(B,A)
(A)
with a positive outcome, flex2B .
In Figure 10, we show the message passing flow between Alice and Bob and the
changes of the EGG/YOLK configurations. The MN results in a path, shown in Fig-
ure 11, from node 8 to node 41 of the graph in Figure 9.

3.3.2 Generalized Stubbornness Knowledge
Suppose that one agent’s stubbornness set is a generalization of the theory of the
opponent, i.e. they are consistent and one is a restriction of the other. Then
stubi → stubj
The generalization (weakening, relaxing, etc.) relation between stubbornness the-
ories is represented in RCC5 as the partial proper part relation between eggs. We
assumed that the stubbornness part of the agent theory never changes, then the mod-
els satisfying it are fixed at the beginning of the negotiation process.
On the other hand, the flexible sets are relaxed or changed during the negotiation
process so that the models satisfying them change during the negotiation. The flexible
models are the yolks of the RCC theory.
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Fig. 11 The MN path of the Alice and Bob message passing in Figure 10.
In Table 9, we show the possible yolk configurations and we give a statement
representing the configuration, i.e. the negotiation state.
Configuration Formula
8
(stubi → stubj) ∧ ¬(flex i ∧ flex j) ∧ (flex i → stubj) ∧
¬(flex j ∧ stubi)
13
(stubi → stubj) ∧ ¬(flex i ∧ flex j) ∧ (flex i → stubj) ∧
(flex j ∨ stubi) ∧ ¬(flex j → stubi) ∧ ¬(stubi → flex j)
20 (stubi → stubj) ∧ (flex i ∨ flex j) ∧ ¬(flex i → flex j) ∧
¬(flex i → flex j) ∧ (flex i → stubj) ∧ (flex j ∨ stubi) ∧
¬(flex j → stubi) ∧ ¬(stubi → flex j)
22
(stubi → stubj) ∧ (flex i → flex j) ∧ (flex i → stubj) ∧
(stubi → flex j)
24
(stubi → stubj) ∧ (flex i → flex j) ∧ (flex i → stubj) ∧
(flex j ∨ stubi) ∧ ¬(flex j → stubi) ∧ ¬(stubi → flex j)
27
(stubi → stubj) ∧ ¬(flex i ∧ flex j) ∧ (flex i → stubj) ∧
(flex j → stubi)
Continued on next page
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Table 9 – continued from previous page
Configuration Formula
32
(stubi → stubj) ∧ (flex i ∨ flex j) ∧ ¬(flex i → flex j) ∧
¬(flex j → flex i) ∧ (flex i → stubj) ∧ (flex j → stubi)
34
(stubi → stubj) ∧ (flex i → flex j) ∧ (flex j ↔ stubi) ∧
(flex i → stubj)
37
(stubi → stubj) ∧ (flex i → flex j) ∧ (flex i → stubj) ∧
(flex j → stubi)
38
(stubi → stubj) ∧ (flex j → flex i) ∧ (flex i → stubj) ∧
(flex j → stubi)
41
(stubi → stubj) ∧ (flex i ↔ flex j) ∧ (flex i → stubj) ∧
(flex j → stubi)
Table 9: Configurations for generalized/restricted stubbornness sets. The
stubbornness knowledge of agent i, identified by plain lines, is generalized
by the stubbornness knowledge of the agent j, identified by dashed lines.
Figure 12 depicts the graph of the possible negotiation relations of the agents
during the negotiation. The nodes are the EGG/YOLK configurations and the edges
are colored by the agent who makes the next bid. The gray node identifies the positive
outcome of the negotiation.
All the rules of agent i, identified by plain lines, are legitimate. The violation rules
are used only by the agent j, identified by dashed lines.
In the following example, we show how deductive rules of MND are used and their
effects in the EGG/YOLK configurations when the stubbornness knowledge of agents
are in a generalization/restriction relation.
Example 7 Suppose Alice and Bob are related as in configuration 8. Alice, A, is the
first bidding agent and she proposes flex0A to Bob, B. Bob receives the proposal and
evaluates it. Bob tests that they are in essence disagreement. Bob generalizes his initial
viewpoint flex0B by:
flex0B → flex1B ¬(stubB ↔ flex0B)
flex1B
(W )
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Fig. 12 Transition graph for generalized (or restricted) stubbornness knowledge: the stub-
bornness knowledge of agent i, identified by plain lines, is a restriction of the stubbornness
knowledge of agent j, identified by dashed lines. The nodes are colored: the gray node is the
configuration of the positive outcome of the negotiation process.
and he checks the provisional negotiation situation by:
A : flex0A ¬(flex0B ∧ τB,A(flex0A)) ∧ (stubB ∨ τB,A(flex0A)
B : essDis(A : flex0A) ∩B : flex1B
(ED)
Bob says to Alice that they are in essence disagreement and makes a proposal flex1B .
The system continues the MN by:
∗(A,B) A : flex0A B : essDis(A : flex0A) B : flex1B
Negotiate(A,B)
(N)
Alice receives flex1B and she makes a weakening or a changing action because Bob
said they are not in agreement nor in relative disagreement. Suppose Alice changes her
CAF by:
flex0A ¬(stubA ↔ flex0A) ¬(flex0A → flex1A) ¬(flex1A → flex0A)
flex1A
(C)
36
Alice tests the negotiation relation by:
B : essDis(A : flex0A) ∩B : flex1B
(flex1A ∨ τA,B(flex1B)) ∧ ¬(flex1A → τA,B(flex1B)) ∧ ¬(flex1A ← τA,B(flex1B))
A : comp(B : flex1B) ∩A : flex1A
(ED-Co)
Alice says to Bob that they are in compatibility and makes a proposal flex1A.
The system continues the MN by:
∗(B,A) B : flex1B A : comp(B : flex1B) A : flex1A
Negotiate(B,A)
(N)
Bob receives flex1A and he makes a weakening or a changing action because Alice
said they are not in agreement nor in relative disagreement. Suppose Bob changes his
CAF by:
flex1B ¬(stubB ↔ flex1B) ¬(flex1B → flex2B) ¬(flex2B → flex1B)
flex2B
(C)
Bob tests the negotiation relation and makes a violation by:
A : comp(B : flex1B) ∩A : flex1A
(stubB ∨ τB,A(flex1A)) ∧ ¬(flex2B ∧ τB,A(flex1A))
B : essDis(A : flex1A) ∩B : flex2B
(Co-ED)
Bob says to Alice that they are in essence disagreement and makes a proposal flex2B .
The system continues the MN by:
∗(A,B) A : flex1A B : essDis(A : flex1A) B : flex2B
Negotiate(A,B)
(N)
Alice receives flex2B and she makes a weakening or a changing action because Bob
said they are not in agreement nor in relative disagreement. Suppose Alice changes her
CAF by:
flex1A ¬(stubA ↔ flex1A) ¬(flex1A → flex2A) ¬(flex2A → flex1A)
flex2A
(C)
Alice tests the negotiation relation by:
B : essDis(A : flex1A) ∩B : flex2B
(flex2A ∨ τA,B(flex2B)) ∧ ¬(flex2A → τA,B(flex2B)) ∧ ¬(flex2A ← τA,B(flex2B))
A : comp(B : flex2B) ∩A : flex2A
(ED-Co)
Alice says to Bob that they are in compatibility and makes a proposal flex2A.
∗(B,A) B : flex2B A : comp(B : flex2B) A : flex2A
Negotiate(B,A)
(N)
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Fig. 13 A MN scenario between Alice and Bob with stubbornness knowledge of Alice is a
restriction of the stubbornness knowledge of Bob: the message passing flow (a) and the changes
of their CAFs (b). White yolks represent the precedent proposal of the agent and the dotted
gray yolk is the positive outcome of the scenario.
Bob receives flex2A and he makes a weakening or a changing action because Alice
said they are not in agreement nor in relative disagreement. Suppose Bob changes his
CAF by:
flex2B ¬(stubB ↔ flex2B) ¬(flex2B → flex3B) ¬(flex3B → flex2B)
flex3B
(C)
Bob tests the negotiation relation by:
A : comp(B : flex2B) ∩A : flex2A (flex3B → τB,A(flex2A))
B : agree(A : flex2A) ∩B : τB,A(flex2A)
(Co-Ag)
Bob says to Alice that they are in agreement and that they have a common angle
that is flex2A.
The system closes the MN by:
∗(A,B) A : flex2A B : agree(A : flex2A)
Agreement(A,B)
(A)
with a positive outcome, flex2A.
In Figure 13 we show the message passing flow between Alice and Bob and the
changes of the EGG/YOLK configurations.
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Fig. 14 The MN path of the Alice and Bob message passing in Figure 13.
The MN results in a path, showed in Figure 14, from node 8 to node 41 of the
graph in Figure 12.

3.3.3 Consistent Stubbornness Knowledge
Suppose that the agents’ stubbornness knowledge are compatible, i.e. they are consistent
and no one is a restriction or a generalization of the other. Then
(stubi ∨ stubj) ∧ ¬(stubi → stubj) ∧ ¬(stubj → stubi)
The compatibility relation between stubbornness theories is represented in RCC5 as
the partial overlapping relation between eggs. We assumed that if the stubbornness
part of the agent theory never changes, then the models satisfying it are fixed at the
beginning of the negotiation process.
On the other hand, the flexible sets are relaxed or changed during the negotiation
process so the models satisfying them change during the negotiation. The flexible models
are the yolks of the RCC theory.
In Table 10, we show the possible yolk configurations and we give a statement
representing the configuration, i.e. the negotiation state.
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Configuration Formula
2
(stubi ∨ stubj) ∧ ¬(stubi → stubj) ∧ ¬(stubj → stubi) ∧
¬(flex i ∧ flex j) ∧ ¬(flex i ∧ stubj) ∧ ¬(flex j ∧ stubi)
3 (stubi ∨ stubj) ∧ ¬(stubi → stubj) ∧ ¬(stubj → stubi) ∧
¬(flex i ∧ flex j) ∧ (flex i ∨ stubj) ∧ ¬(flex i → stubj) ∧
¬(stubj → flex i) ∧ ¬(flex j ∧ stubi)
4 (stubi ∨ stubj) ∧ ¬(stubi → stubj) ∧ ¬(stubj → stubi) ∧
¬(flex i ∧ flex j) ∧ ¬(flex i ∧ stubj) ∧ (flex j ∨ stubi) ∧
¬(flex j → stubi) ∧ ¬(stubi ∨ flex j)
5
(stubi ∨ stubj) ∧ ¬(stubi → stubj) ∧ ¬(stubj → stubi) ∧
¬(flex i ∧ flex j) ∧ ¬(flex i ∧ stubj) ∧ (flex j → stubi)
6
(stubi ∨ stubj) ∧ ¬(stubi → stubj) ∧ ¬(stubj → stubi) ∧
¬(flex i ∧ flex j) ∧ (flex i → stubj) ∧ ¬(flex j ∧ stubi)
9
(stubi ∨ stubj) ∧ ¬(stubi → stubj) ∧ ¬(stubj →
stubi) ∧ ¬(flex i ∧ flex j) ∧ (flex i ∨ stubj) ∧ ¬(flex i →
stubj) ∧ ¬(stubj → flex i) ∧ (flex j ∨ stubi) ∧ ¬(flex j →
stubi) ∧ ¬(stubi → flex j)
10
(stubi ∨ stubj) ∧ ¬(stubi → stubj) ∧ ¬(stubj →
stubi) ∧ ¬(flex i ∧ flex j) ∧ (flex i → stubj) ∧ (flex j ∨
stubi) ∧ ¬(flex j → stubi) ∧ ¬(stubi → flex j)
11
(stubi ∨ stubj) ∧ ¬(stubi → stubj) ∧ ¬(stubj →
stubi) ∧ ¬(flex i ∧ flex j) ∧ (flex i ∨ stubj) ∧ ¬(flex i →
stubj) ∧ ¬(stubj → flex i) ∧ (flex j → stubi)
14
(stubi ∨ stubj) ∧ ¬(stubi → stubj) ∧ ¬(stubj →
stubi) ∧ (flex i ∨ flex j) ∧ ¬(flex i → flex j) ∧ ¬(flex j →
flex i) ∧ (flex i ∨ stubj) ∧ ¬(flex i → stubj) ∧ ¬(stubj →
flex i)∧(flex j∨stubi)∧¬(flex j → stubi)∧¬(stubi → flex j)
15
(stubi ∨ stubj) ∧ ¬(stubi → stubj) ∧ ¬(stubj →
stubi) ∧ (flex i ∨ flex j) ∧ ¬(flex i → flex j) ∧ ¬(flex j →
flex i) ∧ (flex i → stubj) ∧ (flex j ∨ stubi) ∧ ¬(flex j →
stubi) ∧ ¬(stubi → flex j)
16
(stubi ∨ stubj) ∧ ¬(stubi → stubj) ∧ ¬(stubj →
stubi) ∧ (flex i ∨ flex j) ∧ ¬(flex i → flex j) ∧ ¬(flex j →
flex i) ∧ (flex i ∨ stubj) ∧ ¬(flex i → stubj) ∧ ¬(stubj →
flex i) ∧ (flex j → stubi)
Continued on next page
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Configuration Formula
17
(stubi ∨ stubj) ∧ ¬(stubi → stubj) ∧ ¬(stubj →
stubi) ∧ (flex j → flex i) ∧ (flex i ∨ stubj) ∧ ¬(flex i →
stubj) ∧ ¬(stubj → flex i) ∧ (flex j → stubi)
18 (stubi ∨ stubj) ∧ ¬(stubi → stubj) ∧ ¬(stubj → stubi) ∧
(flex i → flex j) ∧ (flex i → stubj) ∧ (flex j ∨ stubi) ∧
¬(flex j → stubi) ∧ ¬(stubi → flex j)
25
(stubi ∨ stubj) ∧ ¬(stubi → stubj) ∧ ¬(stubj → stubi) ∧
¬(flex i ∧ flex j) ∧ (flex i → stubj) ∧ (flex j → stubi)
28 (stubi ∨ stubj) ∧ ¬(stubi → stubj) ∧ ¬(stubj → stubi) ∧
(flex i ∨ flex j) ∧ ¬(flex i → flex j) ∧ ¬(flex j → flex i) ∧
(flex i → stubj) ∧ (flex j → stubi)
29
(stubi ∨ stubj) ∧ ¬(stubi → stubj) ∧ ¬(stubj → stubi) ∧
(flex j → flex i) ∧ (flex i → stubj) ∧ (flex j → stubi)
30
(stubi ∨ stubj) ∧ ¬(stubi → stubj) ∧ ¬(stubj → stubi) ∧
(flex i → flex j) ∧ (flex i → stubj) ∧ (flex j → stubi)
39
(stubi ∨ stubj) ∧ ¬(stubi → stubj) ∧ ¬(stubj → stubi) ∧
(flex i ↔ flex j) ∧ (flex i → stubj) ∧ (flex j → stubi)
Table 10: Configurations for consistent stubbornness sets. The stubborn-
ness knowledge of the agent i, identified by plain lines, is only consistent
by the stubbornness knowledge of the agent j, identified by dashed lines.
Figure 15 depicts the graph of the possible negotiation relations of the agents
during the negotiation. The nodes are the EGG/YOLK configurations and the edges
are colored by the agent who makes the next bid. The gray node identifies the positive
outcome of the negotiation.
Both agents may make legitimate or violation actions, thus they may use or not
the violation rules in Table 3.
In the following example, we show how deductive rules of MND are used and their
effects in the EGG/YOLK configurations when the stubbornness knowledge of agents
are consistent and no generalization or restriction relation exist between them.
Example 8 Suppose Alice and Bob are related as in configuration 2. Alice, A, is the
first bidding agent and she proposes flex0A to Bob, B. Bob receives the proposal and
evaluates it. Bob tests that they are in absolute disagreement. Bob generalizes his
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Fig. 15 Transition graph for consistent and not generalized/restricted stubbornness knowl-
edge: the stubbornness knowledge of agent i, identified by plain lines, is not a restriction of the
stubbornness knowledge of agent j, identified by dashed lines, and vice versa but they have
shared semantical structures. The nodes are coloured: the gray node is the configuration of the
positive outcome of the negotiation process.
initial viewpoint flex0B by:
flex0B → flex1B ¬(stubB ↔ flex0B)
flex1B
(W )
and he checks the provisional negotiation situation by:
A : flex0A ¬(stubB ∧ τB,A(flex0A))
B : absDis(A : flex0A) ∩B : flex1B
(AD)
Bob says to Alice that they are in absolute disagreement and makes a proposal flex1B .
The system continues the MN by:
∗(A,B) A : flex0A B : absDis(A : flex0A) B : flex1B
Negotiate(A,B)
(N)
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Alice receives flex1B and she makes a weakening or a changing action because Bob
said they are not in agreement nor in relative disagreement. Suppose Alice changes her
CAF by:
flex0A ¬(stubA ↔ flex0A) ¬(flex0A → flex1A) ¬(flex1A → flex0A)
flex1A
(C)
Alice tests the negotiation relation by:
B : absDis(A : flex0A) ∩B : flex1B
(stubA ∨ τA,B(flex1B)) ∧ ¬(flex1A ∧ τA,B(flex1B))
A : essDis(B : flex1B) ∩A : flex1A
(AD-ED)
Alice says to Bob that they are in essence disagreement and makes a proposal flex1A.
The system continues the MN by:
∗(B,A) B : flex1B A : essDis(B : flex1B) A : flex1A
Negotiate(B,A)
(N)
Bob receives flex1A and he makes a weakening or a changing action because Alice
said they are not in agreement nor in relative disagreement. Suppose Bob changes her
CAF by:
flex1B ¬(stubB ↔ flex1B) ¬(flex1B → flex2B) ¬(flex2B → flex1B)
flex2B
(C)
Bob tests the negotiation relation by:
A : essDis(B : flex1B) ∩A : flex1A
(stubB ∨ τB,A(flex1A)) ∧ ¬(flex2B ∧ τB,A(flex1A))
B : essDis(A : flex1A) ∩B : flex2A
(ED-ED)
Bob says to Alice that they are in essence disagreement and makes a proposal flex2B .
The system continues the MN by:
∗(A,B) A : flex1A B : essDis(A : flex1A) B : flex2B
Negotiate(A,B)
(N)
Alice receives flex2B and she makes a weakening or a changing action because Bob
said they are not in agreement nor in relative disagreement. Suppose Alice generalizes
her CAF by:
flex1A → flex2A ¬(stubA ↔ flex1A)
flex2A
(W )
Alice tests the negotiation relation by:
B : essDis(A : flex1A) ∩B : flex2B
(flex2A ∨ τA,B(flex2B)) ∧ ¬(flex2A → τA,B(flex2B)) ∧ ¬(flex2A ← τA,B(flex2B))
A : comp(B : flex2B) ∩A : flex2A
(ED-Co)
Alice says to Bob that they are in compatibility and makes a proposal flex2A.
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∗(B,A) B : flex2B A : comp(B : flex2B) A : flex2A
Negotiate(B,A)
(N)
Bob receives flex2A and he makes a weakening or a changing action because Alice
said they are not in agreement nor in relative disagreement. Suppose Bob changes her
CAF by:
flex2B ¬(stubB ↔ flex2B) ¬(flex2B → flex3B) ¬(flex3B → flex2B)
flex3B
(C)
Bob tests the negotiation relation by:
A : comp(B : flex2B) ∩A : flex2A
(flex3B → τB,A(flex2A)) ∧ ¬(flex3B ← τB,A(flex2A))
B : relDis(A : flex2A) ∩B : flex3B
(Co-RD)
Bob says to Alice that they are in relative disagreement and makes a proposal flex3B .
The system continues the MN by:
∗(A,B) A : flex2A B : relDis(A : flex2A) B : flex3B
Negotiate(A,B)
(N)
Alice receives flex2B and she cannot to make a weakening or a changing action
because Bob said they are in relative disagreement. Alice accepts the proposal of Bob
by:
B : relDis(A : flex2A) ∩B : flex3B
A : agree(B : flex3B) ∩A : τA,B(flex2A)
(RD-Ag)
Alice says to Bob that they are in agreement and that they have a common angle that
is flex3B .
The system closes the MN by:
∗(B,A) B : flex3B A : agree(B : flex3B)
Agreement(B,A)
(A)
with a positive outcome, flex3B .
In Figure 16 we show the message passing flow between Alice and Bob and the
changes of the EGG/YOLK configurations.
The MN results in a path, showed in Figure 17, from node 2 to node 39 of the
graph in Figure 15. 
4 Related Work
The Meaning Negotiation problem has reached large attention in the Artificial Intel-
ligence community. Two are the most general approaches to the problem of finding a
shared knowledge from many different and possibly inconsistent ones. The first way
to model the MN process is by viewing it as a conflict resolution. The participants of
a negotiation litigate about how to share something and they may disagree in many
ways by Hunter and Summerton (2006).
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Fig. 16 A MN scenario between Alice and Bob with consistent stubbornness knowledge:
the message passing flow (a) and the changes of their CAFs (b). White yolks represent the
precedent proposal of the agent and the dotted gray yolk is the positive outcome of the scenario.
Argumentation theory, or argumentation, is the interdisciplinary study of how hu-
mans should, can, and do reach conclusions through logical reasoning, that is, claims
based, soundly or not, on premises. It includes the arts and sciences of civil debate, di-
alogue, conversation, and persuasion. It studies rules of inference, logic, and procedural
rules in both artificial and real world settings.
Argumentation includes debate and negotiation which are concerned with reaching
mutually acceptable conclusions (Kraus et al, 1998; Parsons et al, 1998; Atkinson et al,
2005; Schroeder and Schweimeier, 2002). It also encompasses eristic dialog, the branch
of social debate in which victory over an opponent is the primary goal. This art and
science is often the means by which people protect their beliefs or self-interests in
rational dialogue, in common parlance, and during the process of arguing. The main
approaches to the Argumentation theory are: the pragma-dialectical theory and the
argumentative schemes.
In pragma-dialectical theory, the argumentation is viewed as a critical discussion
about the resolution of a conflicts. In this ideal model of a critical discussion, four
discussion stages are distinguished that the discussion parties have to go through to
resolve their difference of opinion (see (van Eemeren and Grootendorst, 1984) pp.85-88;
(van Eemeren and Grootendorst, 1992), pp.34-35; (van Eemerena and Grootendorst,
2004), pp.59-62):
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Fig. 17 The MN path of the Alice and Bob message passing in Figure 16.
1. the confrontation stage: the interlocutors establish that they have a difference of
opinion;
2. opening stage: they decide to resolve this difference of opinion. The interlocutors
determine their points of departure: they agree upon the rules of the discussion
and establish which propositions they can use in their argumentation;
3. argumentation stage: the protagonist defends his/her standpoint by putting forward
arguments to counter the antagonists objections or doubt;
4. concluding stage: the discussion parties evaluate to what extent their initial differ-
ence of opinion has been resolved and in whose favor.
The ideal model stipulates ten rules (see (van Eemeren, 2002), pp.182-183) that
apply to an argumentative discussion. Violations of the discussion rules are said to
frustrate the reasonable resolution of the difference of opinion and they are therefore
considered as fallacies.
The representation of Argumentative schemes constitutes one of the central topics
in current argumentation theory and they represent common patterns of reasoning
used in everyday conversational discourse. Important contributions to the study of
argument schemes have been made by Douglas Walton (Douglas, 1996; Prakken et al,
2003; Douglas, 2005; Douglas et al, 2008; Prakken et al, 2003). As considered by him,
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argument schemes technically have the form of an inference rule: an argument scheme
has a set of premises and a conclusion.
The argumentation schemes approach is based upon the Toulmin model of the
argumentation (Toulmin, 2003).
The process of resolving conflicts between agents by argumentation involves not
only a negotiation dialogue, but also a persuasion one (Walton and Krabbe, 1995).
The participants in a negotiation by argumentation propose arguments to the oppo-
nents and make counterproposals in two way: by rebutting and or by undercutting the
proposals of the opponents. Rebuttal of a rule claiming c, is made by a rule in which
the claim is the negation of c. A rule r undercuts a rule r′ if the claim of r is the
negation of some of the premises of r′.
When no undercut and rebuttal rules are available, an agent can accept the argu-
ment posted by someone else in the system in two ways (Dung et al, 2007):
– skeptical : the argument is acceptable until somebody else claims the contrary;
– credulous: the argument is wholeheartedly accepted.
In (Dung, 1995) the author explores the mechanisms humans use in argumentation to
state the correctness, the appropriateness and the acceptability of arguments.
To persuade the opponents about the validity of the argument she proposes, the
proponent has to justify it (Pollock, 1994, 2001; Walton, 2005; Rubinelli, September
2006; Katie Atkinson, 2004; Thakur et al, 2007) or to have its proof. Recent inves-
tigations have dealt with the problem about who has the burden of proving a claim
and which argument produces a burden of proof (Farley and Freeman, 1995; Walton,
2003; Prakken et al, 2005; Oren et al, 2007; Gordon et al, 2007). In (Iva´n et al, 2000)
a complete survey of the logical models of arguments is presented.
Argumentation Theory is largely used in legal reasoning to model the interactions
according to the legal debate rules (Daskalopulu and Sergot, 1997; Gordon and Walton,
2009; Bench-Capon, 1997; Kowalski and Toni, 1996). In particular, in (Bench-Capon
et al, 2005), the authors formalise an argumentation framework in order to model the
definitions of objectively and subjectively acceptable, and indefensible argument. The
definition of the above degrees of acceptance of an argument is based upon a value
given to the arguments and a form of preference between them that the agents have.
In (Maudet et al, 2006), the authors present a brief survey of argumentation in
multi-agent systems. It is not only brief, but rather idiosyncratic, and focuses on the
areas of research of belief revision, agent communication and reasoning.
The second way to model MN is as a set of operations on the beliefs’ sets of the
agents involved. The scope is to construct a commonly accepted knowledge as the
process of merging information becoming from different sources. The problem of how
the merging has to be done was approached in two steps:
– how the different sources have inconsistent beliefs and how they are mutually reli-
able;
– how and when beliefs causing conflicts have to be merged into the knowledge base.
The first point was studied by the information fusion researchers and the second by
the belief revision ones.
In (Gre´goire and Konieczny, 2006) the author makes a survey of the contributions
from the artificial intelligence research literature about logic-based information fusion.
The assumption made by the early approaches were:
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– Information sources are mutually independent;
– All sources exhibit the same level of importance;
– The level of information importance is also constant.
The main assumption regards the completely reliance of all the information sources as
in (Booth, 2006). More realistic approaches suppose that the information sources are
not equally reliable and that some source is preferred with respect to the available ones.
In (Gre´goire, 2006) the reliability of the information sources is defined as a preference
order. Another precedent approach assume a weight applied to the beliefs for each
source by which they belong (Lin, 1996).
In the situations in which the information sources are equally reliable, the merging
is said non-prioritized otherwise a degree of certainty or plausibility is given to the
belief (Ferme´ and Rott, 2004).
When the beliefs coming from the different sources, they have to be merged in order
to minimally change the initial knowledge base. The operation needed to add new
information into a knowledge base is known as revision and it involves only conflicting
beliefs during a negotiation process. The general approach of maximal adjustment is to
remove the present belief causing the conflict and adding the new one. In (Benferhat
et al, 2004) the author present a disjunctive maximal adjustment in which the belief
are weighted and thus not always removed or simply added into the knowledge base.
The merging2 of beliefs was defined by two operators (Liberatore and Schaerf,
1998): majority and arbitration. Both make assumptions upon the information sources.
The former revises the knowledge base by belief belonging to the majority number of
information sources. The latter revises the knowledge bases by the beliefs belonging to
the most reliable information sources.
In (Konieczny, 2000) the author defines the postulates regulating the merging op-
erators by assuming that there are integrity constraints to assure.
Thus, in a belief merging and information fusion literature, the negotiation is mod-
eled as a two stage processes: contraction of the beliefs causing the conflict and expan-
sions by the new knowledge (Booth, 2006). In (Zhang et al, 2004) the author define
a way to formalize the negotiation process as a function and he proposes a set of
postulates, similar to the AGM ones for revision for the negotiation function.
5 Conclusions
We presented a formalization of the MN problem by means of a deduction system. As
we remarked in many different places of the paper, the literature has dealt with several
issues of the negotiation of meaning, but what has been only partially treated is the
description of the process of reaching agreement conditions.
Here, we focused upon the MN problem in terms of knowledge representation and
of automatic mechanism of reaching an agreement. First, we defined a negotiating
agent by two set of knowledge: stubborn and flexible. The stubborn knowledge of the
agent is the unquestionable one and it represents the necessary properties to define the
meaning of the set of terms the agent is negotiating. Instead, the flexible knowledge
2 One can be tempted to assume that arbitration and majority operators can be fruitfully
employed to solve any admissible problem of negotiation. However, negotiation is the process of
reaching agreements not the underlying semantic theory about the models. Therefore, although
we can model the resulting theory by the theory of belief revision, negotiation processes are
out of scope in these theories.
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is the representation of the properties that the agent thinks as not necessary, but
can be useful, to define the negotiating terms. A negotiating agent is willing to cede
with respect to non necessary properties. After the definition of an agent and of her
knowledge, we defined the agreement condition as the situation in which all the agent or
an acceptable part of them agree with the same proposal, i.e. when the agents consider
the proposal as an acceptable common angle. Otherwise the agents are in disagreement.
We identified four ways in which agents are in disagreement: absolute, essence,
relative or compatibility. The disagreement relation is binary because it depends upon
the relation between the knowledge of the agents, thus, for instance, Alice may have
inconsistent knowledge with respect to the knowledge of Bob (absolute disagreement)
and she may have a consistent but not generalised or restricted knowledge with respect
to the knowledge of Charles (compatibility).
Afterwards we defined rules for deriving streams of dialog between an arbitrary
number of meaning negotiating agents by assuming that in a multiparty MN the first
proposing agent behaves as a referee in an English Auction Game; and we defined a
deduction system, MND , based upon these rules, which derives a stream of dialog that
ends with an agreement (or disagreement) condition.
There are several different ways in which this investigation can be taken further,
in particular by investigating the formal properties of MND , such as soundness and
completeness. The proofs of consistency and adequacy do not fix the relation to a
given semantics, which is needed for a proof of soundness and a proof of completeness.
Usually, a deduction system can be proved sound and complete against a standard
interpretation of the language, which is difficult to circumscribe in our case, because of
the presence of the relations between agents to be represented. A standard definition
of the semantics for the MND systems is therefore needed in front of any further
investigation of the soundness and completeness properties.
We deliberately avoided to investigate the formal logical properties of the system
at this stage, for the sake of clarity and readability. It shall be argument of another
paper.
Our formalization of the MN process may be considered credulous in the sense of
the Argumentation literature (see Section 4). In fact, with the rule (RD-Ag) an agent
accepts the proposal ϕ even if it is not equivalent to her current angle: the accepting
agent trusts in the proposing agent. As a future work, we will study the properties
of credulousness and skepticism of the rules of the deduction system. Moreover, the
investigation of the trustworthiness among negotiating agents is interesting because a
credulous or a skeptical deduction system may be adopted depending upon the trust
relation among agents: an agent may be credulous with respect to a trustworthy agent
and skeptical with a non-trustworthy one.
In this paper, we assumed that agents are truthful thus they never inform the
opponents about something wrongly. Fraudulent agents may try to drive the MN in a
way that is in some sense optimal for themselves. It would be interesting to study the
optimality and minimality of the MN outcomes and the ways, legitimate or not, that
the agents use to reach optimal outcomes.
It would also be interesting to develop a decision making algorithm for those cases
in which the system is decidable, in particular for finite signatures in addition to the
case of competitive agents considered here. This would foster the automation both of
the subjective decision process (i.e., the automation of the deduction system alone)
and of the whole process per se (i.e., the definition of a procedure to establish the
agreement terminal condition).
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The investigation we carried out can also be extended by studying the ways in
which agents can be limited to specific strategies in choosing the next action. Jointly
with the definition of an algorithm for negotiating a common angle, this study can
also enlarge the boundary of decidable cases. In particular, agents using some specific
strategies can apply the rules in a finite number of steps even if the signature is infinite.
Finally, we envisage a further extensions of our approach to applications in infor-
mation security, e.g., investigating the relationships between the MN process and the
management of authorization policies in security protocols and web services.
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j : absDis(i : flexki ) ∩ j : ψ ¬(stubi ∧ τi,j(ψ))
i : absDis(j : ψ) ∩ i : flexk+1i
(AD-AD)
j : absDis(i : flexki ) ∩ j : ψ (stubi ∨ τi,j(ψ)) ∧ ¬(flexk+1i ∧ τi,j(ψ))
i : essDis(j : ψ) ∩ i : flexk+1i
(AD-ED)
j : absDis(i : flexki ) ∩ j : ψ (flexk+1i ∨ τi,j(ψ)) ∧ ¬(flexk+1i → τi,j(ψ)) ∧ ¬(τi,j(ψ)→ flexk+1i )
i : comp(j : ψ) ∩ i : flexk+1i
(AD-Co)
j : absDis(i : flexki ) ∩ j : ψ (flexk+1i → τi,j(ψ)) ∧ ¬(τi,j(ψ)→ flexk+1i )
i : relDis(j : ψ) ∩ i : flexk+1i
(AD-RD)
j : absDis(i : flexki ) ∩ j : ψ (flexk+1i → τi,j(ψ))
i : agree(j : ψ) ∩ i : τi,j(ψ)
(AD-Ag)
j : essDis(i : flexki ) ∩ j : ψ ¬(stubi ∧ τi,j(ψ))
i : absDis(j : ψ) ∩ i : flexk+1i
(ED-AD)
j : essDis(i : flexki ) ∩ j : ψ (stubi ∨ τi,j(ψ)) ∧ ¬(flexk+1i ∧ τi,j(ψ))
i : essDis(j : ψ) ∩ i : flexk+1i
(ED-ED)
j : essDis(i : flexki ) ∩ j : ψ (flexk+1j ∨ τi,j(ψ)) ∧ ¬(flexk+1i → τi,j(ψ)) ∧ ¬(τi,j(ψ)→ flexk+1i )
i : comp(j : ψ) ∩ i : flexk+1i
(ED-Co)
j : essDis(i : flexki ) ∩ j : ψ (flexk+1i → τi,j(ψ)) ∧ ¬(τi,j(ψ)→ flexk+1i )
i : relDis(j : ψ) ∩ i : flexk+1i
(ED-RD)
j : essDis(i : flexki ) ∩ j : ψ (flexk+1i → τi,j(ψ))
i : agree(j : ψ) ∩ i : τi,j(ψ)
(ED-Ag)
j : comp(i : flexki ) ∩ j : ψ (stubi ∨ τi,j(ψ)) ∧ ¬(flexk+1i ∧ τi,j(ψ))
i : essDis(j : ψ) ∩ i : flexk+1i
(Co-ED)
j : comp(i : flexki ) ∩ j : ψ (flexk+1j ∨ τi,j(ψ)) ∧ ¬(flexk+1i → τi,j(ψ)) ∧ ¬(τi,j(ψ)→ flexk+1i )
i : comp(j : ψ) ∩ i : flexk+1i
(Co-Co)
j : comp(i : flexki ) ∩ j : ψ (flexk+1i → τi,j(ψ)) ∧ ¬(τi,j(ψ)→ flexk+1i )
i : relDis(j : ψ) ∩ i : flexk+1i
(Co-RD)
j : comp(i : flexki ) ∩ j : ψ (flexk+1i → τi,j(ψ))
i : agree(j : ψ) ∩ i : τi,j(ψ)
(Co-Ag)
j : relDis(i : ϕ) ∩ j : ψ
i : agree(j : ψ) ∩ i : τi,j(ψ)
(RD-Ag)
Table 3 Rules for the following proposing agents.
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∗(i, j) i : ϕ j : na(i : ϕ) j : ψ stubi ↔ ϕ stubj ↔ ψ
Disagreement(i, j)
(D)
∗(i, j) i : ϕ j : agree(i : ϕ)
Agreement(i, j)
(A)
∗(i, j) i : ϕ j : na(i : ϕ) j : ψ
Negotiate(i, j)
(N)
Table 4 1-1 MN system transition rules.
j : comp(i : flexki ) ∩ j : ψ ¬(stubi ∧ τi,j(ψ))
i : absDis(j : ψ) ∩ i : flexk+1i
(Co-AD)
j : relDis(i : flexki ) ∩ j : ψ (stubi ∨ τi,j(ϕ)) ∧ ¬(flexk+1i ∧ τi,j(ψ))
i : essDis(j : ψ) ∩ i : flexk+1i
(RD-ED)
j : relDis(i : flexki ) ∩ j : ψ (flexk+1i ∨ τi,j(ψ)) ∧ ¬(flexk+1i → τi,j(ψ)) ∧ ¬(τi,j(ψ)→ flexk+1i )
i : comp(j : ψ) ∩ i : flexk+1i
(RD-Co)
j : relDis(i : flexki ) ∩ j : ψ (flexk+1i → τi,j(ψ)) ∧ ¬(τi,j(ψ)→ flexk+1i )
i : relDis(j : ψ) ∩ i : flexk+1i
(RD-RD)
j : agree(i : flexki ) ∩ j : ψ ¬(stubi ∧ τi,j(ψ))
i : absDis(j : ψ) ∩ i : flexk+1i
(Ag-AD)
j : agree(i : flexki ) ∩ j : ψ (stubi ∨ τi,j(ψ)) ∧ ¬(flexk+1i ∧ τi,j(ψ))
i : essDis(j : ψ) ∩ i : flexk+1i
(Ag-ED)
j : agree(i : flexki ) ∩ j : ϕ (flexk+1i ∨ τi,j(ψ)) ∧ ¬(flexk+1i → τi,j(ψ)) ∧ ¬(τi,j(ψ)→ flexk+1i )
i : comp(j : v) ∩ i : flexk+1i
(Ag-Co)
j : agree(i : flexki ) ∩ j : ψ (flexk+1i → τi,j(ψ)) ∧ ¬(τi,j(ψ)→ flexk+1i )
i : relDis(j : ψ) ∩ i : flexk+1i
(Ag-RD)
j : agree(i : flexki ) ∩ j : ψ (flexk+1i → τi,j(ψ))
i : agree(j : ψ) ∩ i : τi,j(ψ)
(Ag-Ag)
Table 5 Extension of the rules in Table 3 for the auctioneer. All these rules are violations
and the rule (Ag-Ag) may be used also by negotiating agents.
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∗(a, i1, . . . , in) a : ϕ for all i ∈ Ag1.i : agree(a : ϕ) for all j ∈ Ag2.j : na(a : ϕ)| Ag1 |≤ α for all i ∈ Ag.i : ψ and stubi ↔ ψ
Disagreement(a, i1, . . . , in)
(DD)
∗(a, i1, . . . , in) a : ϕ for all i ∈ Ag1.i : agree(a : ϕ)
for all j ∈ Ag2.j : na(a : ϕ) | Ag1 |≥ α
Agreement(a, i1, . . . , in)
(AA)
∗(a, i1, . . . , in) a : ϕ for all i ∈ Ag1.i : agree(a : ϕ) for all j ∈ Ag2.j : na(a : ϕ) | Ag1 |≤ α
Negotiate(a, i1, . . . , in)
(NN)
Table 6 1-n MN system transition rules.
Configuration Formula
1 ¬(stubi ∧ stubj)
Table 7 Configurations for inconsistent stubbornness knowledge. Agent i is identified by plain
lines and agent j by dashed lines.
